“Responsibilist Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies, 172(11), 2015
When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands of cases involving epistemic irresponsibility. I critically discuss such a case as put forward by Jason Baehr. After providing an argument that clarifies why the case is problematic for Evidentialism, I defend my argument from a response by Earl Conee. Then I develop a theory of epistemic justification capable of handling cases involving epistemic irresponsibility, and I defend this theory from evidentialist objections.
“A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy,” with Christopher Buford, Episteme, 2017
One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
“Reflective Equilibrium – A Brief Introduction,” in Methods in Analytic Philosophy, ed., Joachim Horvath, Bloomsbury (forthcoming)
“Ignorance and Accountability: The Epistemic Condition on
Moral Responsibility” (Dissertation)
It is commonly thought that there are at least two conditions on moral responsibility: the freedom or control condition, and the knowledge or epistemic condition. The literature on moral responsibility contains elaborate accounts of the control condition, but it contains relatively few detailed accounts of the epistemic condition. My dissertation aims to help rectify this imbalance.
- Director: Aaron Zimmerman; Committee: Kevin Falvey, John Greco, Matthew Hanser, Pamela Hieronymi.