Error theory is a view that's skeptical about morality. It claims that people are systematically in error when they make moral judgments. You might think you know that genocide is morally wrong, but for J.L. Mackie you don't know this. There are no objective moral values or properties for your judgment to latch onto. Morality is something like a useful delusion. In this post, I explain big ideas in Mackie's Error Theory.
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Mackie's Error Theory
Do you know that genocide is morally wrong? Seems obvious you know it, right. Well, maybe not.
Knowing something requires that thing being true. What you believe must correspond to reality. But if there’s nothing in objective reality for that belief to correspond to, it isn’t true. And if it isn’t true, you don’t know it. You don’t actually know that genocide is morally wrong.
By the end of this post, you’ll understand how philosopher J.L. Mackie reaches the shocking claim that there’s no moral knowledge.
Error Theory Explained
Error theory is a theory that embraces moral anti-realism. Anti-realist views hold that there are no mind-independent moral objects or properties. Moral properties like rightness, wrongness, obligations, justice, and so on are merely psychological or cultural inventions. Such things do not exist in the world in an objective sense (i.e., apart from subjects).
Mackie’s theory is called “error theory” for a particular reason. It holds that when we make moral judgments we systematically fall into error. To see how this works, let's consider some examples.
When we say things about the morality of immigration, gun control, health care, and racism, we use moral terms. We say racism is morally wrong or bad. We’re trying to latch onto a feature of the world…the immorality of racism.
Error theory holds we’re mistaken. There are no moral facts in the external world for our moral judgments to correspond to. So, our moral judgments fail to capture the moral dimension of things. We fall into error when we use moral terms. We think we’re doing something that we’re not: making true statements, but all our moral claims are false. No moral facts exist for them to correspond to.
To better see how this works, let’s consider an analogy. If you’ve ever been to a meeting or conference, you know that sometimes people are given name badges that they write their name on. This helps people associate a name with a person. If Tom wrote his real name on the badge, his name corresponds to him—the real-life Tom.
After learning his name I can make true statements about Tom to other people. I might say, “I just met Tom over there. He works in finance for a firm that makes merchandise for pusheen the cat.” My use of “Tom” corresponds to the physical person that does finance for pusheen the cat.
By analogy, let’s imagine that objects represent acts. Think of an act you consider morally wrong and associate it with an object you despise. I’m not into cauliflower. So the act of torturing puppies for fun is represented by a life-sized head of cauliflower. The cauliflower has a badge on it. Mackie claims that I’m mistaken in thinking that the cauliflower has the word “immoral” written into its name badge. When I judge that torturing puppies for fun is immoral I’m mistaken. Unlike the word Tom that corresponds to the pusheen finance guy, the word “immoral” doesn’t correspond to the cauliflower. When I go around saying the cauliflower is immoral I do not make a true judgment.
That he’s Tom describes something properly associated with the physical person. It’s an accurate representation of the property of having a specific name given to him by his parents. By contrast, acts we consider immoral do not have a property of immorality accurately associated with them. Immoral is not a property of the act of torturing puppies for fun.
Moral properties do not exist. There are only descriptions of acts, such as torturing puppies for fun causes them pain. But, when I leap from that description to a value-laden statement, such that doing so is wrong, then I fall into error. There’s no objective moral property of wrongness in the world for that statement about torturing puppies to be true of.
The claim that values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world, is meant to include not only moral goodness...but also other things—rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible. —J.L. Mackie
Mackie's 3 Main Claims
Now let’s look at the three core commitments that led Mackie to claim there's no moral knowledge.
The first claim is: 1. There are no moral features in this world.
When I look at a coffee mug I see that it has properties like shape, size, and color. I can confirm these properties using my senses and using measuring instruments.
When I see someone torturing a puppy I see the pain, but I don’t literally see the wrongness. I cannot use my senses or measuring instruments to confirm the wrongness as existing objectively. Things like moral goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness, are not objective features of our world. No such features exit.
From the first claim it follows that: 2. No moral judgments are true.
Given there are no moral properties, there’s nothing for moral judgments to correspond to. When I say that racism is immoral there is no fact concerning the immorality of racism for that statement to correspond to.
The third claim puts the “error” in error theory: 3. Our moral judgments fail to describe the moral properties of things.
When we try to make moral judgments using moral terms we fall into error. We think we’re describing the moral properties of actions, but since actions don’t have such properties, all such statements are false. They're mistaken. We lapse into error when we make moral judgments.
From 1,2, and 3, it follows that: 4. There is no moral knowledge.
As stated at the start of this post, truth is a requirement of knowledge. So if all moral judgments are false, then moral judgments cannot amount to knowledge. They lack the necessary ingredient of truth.
Moral Disagreement
Let’s land this plane by citing one bit of evidence Mackie uses to support his error theory.
There’s widespread disagreement about the morality of many acts. Think about the morality of abortion or capital punishment. He takes this disagreement as evidence that no objective moral values exist.
But he thinks scientific disagreement about, for instance, the properties of our universe, such as whether the universe began at a point in time or is eternal. Mackie thinks moral disagreement and scientific disagreement differ.
Moral disagreement cast doubt on there being objective moral truths, but scientific disagreement doesn’t cast doubt on there being objective scientific truths.
Do you think he’s right about this point? Why or why not. Leave your thoughts in the comments.
This was really clear and helpful – thank you!!
I’m glad you found it clear and helpful!