Papers

In Progress

Evidence, Reasons, and Epistemic Justification (under revision)

This paper puts forward a new account of epistemic justification. The Evidence and Reasons for Belief (ERB) thesis is offered as a response to deficiencies in a thesis endorsed by Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star (2008, 2009). In section 1, I substantiate the components of ERB in reference to the literature on the nature of propositions, facts, evidence, and normative reasons. Section 2 argues against the Kearns and Star thesis called Reasons as Evidence (RE). This is done by laying bare the logical structure of RE and showing that either of the conditionals in the biconditional endorsed by RE can be falsified using two cases inspired by Richard Foley (1991). In section 3, I argue for ERB in relation to ordinary linguistic intuitions and the ability of ERB to handle the two cases RE was unable to handle. Section 4 responds to a couple of objections to ERB, and section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.

Against the Total Evidence Requirement (5/2010) (Presentation)

The Requirement of Total Evidence (RTE) asks an agent to make her confidence in a belief proportional to the support it receives from her total evidence. This paper examines (RTE) as a norm of epistemic rationality and argues that it is problematic. Looking at the work of Peter Achinstein (2001) on the notion of evidence it becomes clear that (RTE) endorses a view of the constitution of evidence that is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to count as evidence. To overcome this and other deficiencies associated with (RTE) a move is made to an objective view of evidence. This move aligns epistemic rationality with scientific rationality in seeking to capture veridical evidence. It also leads to a new norm of epistemic rationality—the Proper Subset Evidence Requirement (PSER).

Published

The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments - Thesis (ProQuest)

The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments (CMJs) are not truth-conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I set-up the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a justified moral theory realized.

The Utilibot Project (AAAI)

As autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) begin living in the home, performing service tasks and assisting with daily activities, their actions will have profound ethical implications. Consequently, AMRs need to be outfitted with the ability to act morally with regard to human life and safety. Yet, in the area of robotics where morality is a relevant field of endeavor (i.e. human-robot interaction) the sub-discipline of morality does not exist. In response, the Utilibot project seeks to provide a point of initiation for the implementation of ethics in an AMR. The Utilibot is a decision-theoretic AMR guided by the utilitarian notion of the maximization of human well-being. The core ethical decision-making capacity of the Utilibot consists of two dynamic Bayesian networks that model human and environmental health, a dynamic decision network that accounts for decisions and utilities, and a Markov decision process (MDP) that decomposes the planning problem to solve for the optimal course of action to maximize human safety and well-being.

In Neutral*

Williamson on Evidence Neutrality

This paper looks at Timothy Williamson’s formulation of the thesis of Evidence Neutrality (EN). I motivate and argue for an upgraded version of EN by showing that changing one’s assumption about the nature of evidence (i.e. fallibility vs. factivity) generates a different verdict on EN. Then, I show how Williamson’s interpretation of EN is incomplete in light of a principle that guides his complete understanding of the nature of evidence. I reformulate EN to overcome deficiencies in Williamson’s interpretation of EN, and, lastly, I use cases from philosophy and science to show that reformulated-EN promotes better practices in both domains while, at the same time, it avoids psychologizing evidence.

Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe

This paper is a response to an argument put forward by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux (2009). Earlenbaugh and Molyneux argue intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. This conclusion arises out of an analysis that shows intuitions are incapable of being treated as evidence. I argue against this conclusion by undermining key aspects of Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument. In the first section, I explain important distinctions and argumentative tools in Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument. In section 2, I argue against the structure of their argument and block the move they make at the outset of their paper. In the third section, I argue against the idea that intuitions are not basic evidential sources. In section 4, I argue the psychological targets of intuition (i.e., the propositions intuited) are capable of being treated as evidence because they are both belief-entailing and credence-entailing. In the final section, I present two case studies—philosophical practice around the Gettier intuition and the debate between armchair philosophy and experimental philosophy—as examples that show intuitions are treated as evidence by the philosophical community.

Reflective Equilibrium and the Dependence Problem

In this paper, I argue that objections to the method of reflective equilibrium can be overcome by revising the coherentist model of justification and appealing to the literature on belief revision. The primary objection considered is the dependence problem of justification. This objection holds that the method of reflective equilibrium is underdetermined. T.M. Scanlon focuses on how the starting points of the process might underdetermine the outcome, and Daniel Bonevac focuses on how reflective equilibria are underdetermined by adjustment decisions made between judgments, principles and theories. It is argued that these concerns are alleviated by relaxing the assumption of logical closure by shifting from a model of coherence founded on belief sets to a model founded on belief bases. Coherence between considered judgments, moral principles and background theories is typically cast as a categorical concept. Instead, I appropriate a gradational notion of coherence borrowed from the epistemology of belief revision, and I apply the concept to argue that it is possible to realize degrees of reflective equilibrium. This opens up the possibility of an interpersonal comparison of degrees of justification according to how effectively a person holds the reflective equilibrium their decisions embody. This is possible because beliefs within reflective equilibria can be more or less expressive when operating under conditions of change. Lastly, it is argued that discrepancies between judgments, principles and theories can be prioritized based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment.

*May or may not rework.