I just posted a new paper on my papers page. It is a critique of Williamson’s notion of Evidence Neutrality. Here’s the abstract:
- This paper looks at Timothy Williamson’s formulation of the thesis of Evidence Neutrality (EN). I motivate and argue for an upgraded version of EN by showing that changing one’s assumption about the nature of evidence (i.e. fallibility vs. factivity) generates a different verdict on EN. Then, I show how Williamson’s interpretation of EN is incomplete in light of a principle that guides his complete understanding of the nature of evidence. I reformulate EN to overcome deficiencies in Williamson’s interpretation of EN, and, lastly, I use cases from philosophy and science to show that reformulated-EN promotes better practices in both domains while, at the same time, it avoids psychologizing evidence.
In section 3 of Philosophy of Philosophy chapter 7, Williamson targets judgment skepticism. He wonders if skepticism about intuitions is not skepticism about a special form of judgment, but, rather, a special form of skepticism about any kind of judgment. Judgment skeptics try to falsify common sense in favor of science. They question practices of applying concepts in judgment (e.g., the concept of a mountain, belief, knowledge, and possibility). One goal of the skeptic is to show that folk judgments presuppose a false theoretical basis, yet such judgments afford an evolutionary advantage. For example, mountains do not really exist because the underlying metaphysics is false, but use of the ‘mountain convention’ facilitates quick communication and offers practical advantage over, say, giving an accurate yet labored explanation of the true metaphysics of the phenomenon. How does this connect with intuitions?
For Williamson (2004) an ‘intuition’ is arrived at through typical capacities for making judgments. In philosophy this involves the construction of thought experiments. A complex host of cognitive capacities are, for instance, used to arrive at the intuition that the Gettier subject does not know. These capacities include making modal judgments and making counterfactual conditional judgments. The judgment skeptic argues against these ‘armchair’ cognitive capacities. As Williamson mentions:
For judgment skeptics, appeals to intuition are nothing more than the last resort of dogmatic conservativism, in its desperate attempt to hold back the forward march of scientific and metaphysical progress. (2007: 223)
Williamson, as a defender of armchair practices, wants to defend the use of intuitions as he understands them. He makes the following points against the judgment skeptic:
- Self-undermining: Scientific practice involves perceptual judgments. Judgment skeptical arguments apply to the use of microscopes, telescopes, and other instruments that magnify perceptual capacities but do not replace them. Observations including macroscopic objects threaten the use of such observations as evidence because they are grounded in the very common sense ontology skeptics are keen to argue against.
- Question Begging: Looking at judgment skepticism Williamson wonders, “what is the status of scientists’ evidential judgments?” When a scientist judges that a set of evidence best explains a theory, and then a judgment skeptic questions, “what evidence is there that our rankings of explanations are reliable?”, the scientist cannot avoid the charge of begging the question if she answers her rankings are reliable because they best explain another thing (e.g., survival of the species). Using empirical evidence to argue against folk theory does not remove the practices used to obtain the empirical evidence from exposure to judgment skeptical forms of argument.
I’m not sure what I want to say about Williamson’s discussion. The points he makes against judgment skepticism seem valid and well-placed. In fact, I have more of a problem with Williamson’s characterization of intuitions as involving the application of routine capacities for judgment-making. Surely they involve such capacities, but I do not think they can be reduced to or dissolved into those capacities.
I’ll close by pointing you to a good discussion of Williamson (2004, 2005) in David Sosa’s article “Scepticism About Intuition.” Among other things, Sosa argues that intuitions play an illimitable epistemic role that cannot be reduced to ordinary capacities.
In Philosophy of Philosophy chapter 7, section 2 Williamson reaches a provocative conclusion about intuitions:
Philosophers might be better off not using the word “intuition” and its cognates. Their main current function is not to answer questions about the nature of the evidence on offer but to fudge them, by appearing to provide answers without really doing so (2007: 220).
The bumper sticker for Williamson’s argument could be: “intuitions are nothing special.” How does he reach the conclusion that intuitions fail to be distinctive and that they constitute “smoke and mirrors” methodology?
Williamson’s argument against intuitions is reductive. He explores various interpretations of intuitions and shows that each account can be reduced to routine forms of reasoning. Further, he argues that the use of intuitions in philosophy is pernicious. The practice is ineffective in answering philosophical questions and makes what philosophers do look like a scandal against rigor.
The context of this argument is Williamson’s argument against Evidence Neutrality (which I discuss here) and Williamson’s 2004 paper on intuitions (which is found in the journal dialectica). I will not rehearse those arguments, but as a rough summary of key considerations: intuitions are often taken to be evidence in philosophy, as evidence intuitions report psychological facts, Williamson is an externalist about mind, he wants to show that intuitions are not truly evidence, thus his favored understanding of evidence (as factive, not psychological) is unfazed by the misuse of the word “intuition” by philosophers. Put simply, intuition-speak is something philosophers engage in when they run out of arguments and want to try to make evidence uncontentiously decidable. Philosophers need to own up to the fact that evidence is always contestable. This last claim, of course, can be placed in the context of Knowledge and its Limits (i.e., one can know something without being in a position to know it). Now, I will raise problems with Williamson’s treatment of intuitions.
I claim that only if certain distinctions are misapplied or ignored can Williamson help himself to his conclusion to dump the use of “intution” in philosophy. Once certain distinctions are brought into focus his reductive project is thrown into relief.
Williamson’s strategy involves setting the target at intuition minimalists like Lewis (1983) and van Inwagen (1997). For them intuitions are mere opinions, beliefs or attractions to belief. There is nothing distinctive about such intuitions because even a field like science relies on some beliefs. The minimalist conception of intuitions is not distinctive of philosophical practice. If other approaches to intuitions can be show to be non-distinctive, then they can be reduced to the minimalist conception which shows that “intuitions are nothing special.”
When considering the rationalist conception of intuitions Williamson misapplies a distinction between the application of concepts and the grasp of concepts. For Williamson, application of concepts requires skills. Simply grasping concepts is insufficient because certain capacities are required to, for instance, correctly respond to the Gettier case. However, for rationalists like Bealer (1998), applying concepts to cases is part of the standard justificatory procedure. Capabilities for applying concepts to cases are not something separate or over-and-above what it means to correctly grasp concepts. Part of what it means to properly grasp a concept is having correctly applied the concepts to cases. A rationalist like Bealer would not claim that concept possession alone is sufficient, as Williamson implies. Such a reading stems from a misapplication of the application/possession distinction regarding conceptual analysis. As understood by rationalists, intuitions about cases are valuable because they clarify concepts of philosophical importance (e.g., knowledge and justice).
Williamson sharpens his attack against rationalists by looking at their interpretation of intuitions, as intellectual seemings analogous to perceptual seemings. Using the Muller-Lyer illusion as an example Williamson concedes that background information can defeat our inclination to view the two lines as incongruent. We can know how the illusion works and not be fooled. Yet, the richness of the phenomenology between intellectual and perceptual cases are not the same. Williamson argues much more appears to us perceptual when something seems the case versus intellectually when something seems the case. There is no seeming beyond our conscious inclinations to believe certain propositions. These inclinations to believe, however numerous, constitute our informational field. They are what we are justified in believing given our informational position. For example, the inclination to believe the Muller-Lyer lines are incongruent can only be reististed if we are in an informational situation that allows us to be justified in believing the lines are actually congruent, which consists in background knowledge about illusions. This brings up the distinction between situational justification and belief justification (Audi, 2003: 2-3), which seems to throw into relief Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology.
Belief justification is the positive status that attaches to beliefs which warrants us, as rational beings, in thinking the beliefs true. Belief justification is ground on situational justification and knowledge is not possible without justified beliefs. As Audi says:
We cannot have a justified belief without being in a position to have it. Without situational justification we are not in such a position (2003: 3).
So, Williamson cannot impose knowledge from top-down onto beliefs; rather, knowledge must be built-up by having belief justification ground on situational justification. Inclinations to believe can only be stably overridden by justified beliefs. Williamson is correct that feelings or seemings are not analogous in the perceptual and intellectual cases, but in both cases the defeat of inclinations requires an epistemology in contrast with the knowledge-first approach.
There are two other distinctions I think Williamson misses. The first is the distinction is between inferential and non-inferential reasoning. Williamson simply dismisses the possibility of intuitions as non-inferential beliefs. He does this by showing that his intuition examples are inferential in nature. This reduction of intuitions to the inferential variety fails to account for the possibility of intuitions stemming from non-inferential reasoning. Bart Streumer (2007: 3) mentions the following example of non-inferential reasoning:
(Belief:) The weather forecast predicts rain.
(Belief:) The sky is full of clouds.
So, (Belief:) There are reasons to believe that it is going to rain.
It is possible to form a non-inferential belief that there is reason to believe that it is going to rain. One might even intuit that it is going to rain through such a non-inferential process. Williamson seems to discount and dismiss the possibility of non-inferential intuitions without argument.
The last distinction I’ll consider is the difference between having an intuition that P and finding it intuitive that P. Williamson uses the example of revisionary metaphysicians who deny that mountains exist as an example that shows that philosophical practice does not always involve accepting what is intuitive and denying what is not. Such metaphysicians allow the proposition “there are no mountains” into their system because the theoretical upshots outweigh the cost of having to endorse a counterintuitive proposition. Some intuitions, such as complex propositions, may fail to be intuitive. That is, it may require additional reflection to see the truth of the proposition. A proposition might not always invoke a sense of non-inferential credibility, but it may nevertheless be known to be true (see Audi 2008). That some philosophers accept counterintuitive propositions does not show that intuitions fail. It just shows that intuitiveness cannot be equated to something being an intuition.
I’ll start this post with a point about Williamson’s style. In reading Williamson I have found his philosophical style to be terse. He does not provide an abundance of signposts. This requires the reader to take extra time to see what he is arguing for and how the current argument is connected to both what has come before it and what is to come after it. You might say Williamson is famous for pure explication and analysis. At the same time, working through the density of his ideas is very rewarding. When reading Williamson closely I find myself discovering several additional layers to his ideas. This is true of most philosophy, but it finds heightened expression in Williamson as compared to, say, Robert Audi who takes pains to be clear and keep his reader tracking with his arguments. That being said, I’ll dive into section 7.1 of The Philosophy of Philosophy [a shameless signpost :-)].
The big idea in 7.1 is that the thesis of Evidence Neutrality (EN) is false. EN is an initially attractive thesis. It indicates that debate over a hypothesis does not have to be resolved prior to identifying what will be recognized as evidence in the debate. For instance, pro-life and pro-choice adherents debate the hypothesis abortion is morally wrong (h). This debate, as evidenced by the history of the debate, persists in a state of disagreement. However, if EN is true, both sides of the debate can agree that, for example, (p) the neurological-status of the embryo at week 7 is evidence for hypothesis h. Both sides can agree that p constitutes evidence without first having to resolve their differences over h. Both sides can point at the neurological capacities of the embryo at week 7 in debating h. This does not preclude the two sides interpreting the same evidence differently: a pro-life advocate might argue that at 7 weeks the embryo can feel pain, yet a pro-choice advocate might respond that the higher brain functions are not yet developed so it is unlikely that the embryo can feel pain. Both sides agree that the embryo is evidence, but they disagree how the evidence bears on the hypothesis. Despite the attractiveness of this thesis Williamson argues against it:
Having good evidence for a belief does not require being able to persuade all comers, however strange their views, that you have such good evidence. No human beliefs pass that test. Even in principle, we cannot always decide which propositions constitute evidence prior to deciding the main philosophical issue; sometimes the latter is properly implicated in the former. (2007: 212)
For Williamson EN forces one to psychologize evidence. Different people with different theoretical commitments will be committed to saying conflicting things about whether something is evidence. Evidence is not uncontentiously decidable. For Williamson all evidence is true; evidence consists only of facts, and a fact is a true proposition. The only way to agree on the facts, when two parties hold conflicting theoretical commitments, is to retreat to psychological claims (e.g., that I believe or that I am inclined to believe the Gettier proposition is true). Both sides can agree that they are inclined to believe the Gettier proposition without agreeing that the Gettier proposition is true. Such claims may be uncontentiously decidable, but they create a gap—arguing from a psychological premise (a belief) to an epistemological conclusion (a truth). Now I will discuss some concerns I have with Williamson’s argument against EN.
First, it seems Williamson has either begged the question against EN or set the bar too high for what constitutes neutral evidence. If evidence is factive, and within most domains of intellectual inquiry facts (truths) are contestable, then, ceteris paribus, everyone will not agree what constitutes evidence (what really constitute the true propositions). However, starting with a fallibilist account of evidence might accommodate the failures of EN ‘in practice’. Assuming a factive account of evidence from the start and analyzing EN against this yardstick is bound to result in the inability of EN to pass the test of ‘uncontentious decidability’. In other words, the stance Williamson takes on the nature of evidence dooms EN from the start. Regarding EN ‘in principle’, Williamson’s definition of evidence sets up problems for EN. The example Williamson uses involves two theories that entail two propositions:
- T = Every math theorem is evidence.
- T* = No math theorem is evidence.
Whether a math theorem is evidence is not uncontentiously decidable. When proponents of T debate proponents of T* proponents of T* will be committed to saying a theorem is not evidence whereas proponents of T will be committed to saying a theorem is evidence. It seems the two sides will need to resolve their theoretical differences prior to agreeing what constitutes evidence.
Evidence is decidable if there is a method for determining whether the evidence is included in a theory (i.e., a set of well-formed formulas closed under logical consequence). Evidence is ‘uncontentiously decidable’ if both sides can agree that a proposition is admitted as evidence, but whether a proposition is admitted as evidence depends on the theory under which it is admitted. This is accurate when, to borrow a term from Brian Weatherson, EN is interpreted under an ‘alethic’ reading [1]. If EN is read as agreement whether a piece of evidence is true, then theoretical commitments will produce contentious differences in cases where theories entail propositions that are the negation of each other, as in Williamson’s example. But if EN is given an ‘apodeictic’ reading, then it must be decidable whether a piece of evidence bears on the proposition under scrutiny.
Williamson and Weatherson prefer the ‘alethic’ reading because it matches their assumption about evidence, as consisting only of true propositions. Against this, a great deal of evidence can be agreed to as relevant in the debate without having to initially persuade the other party of the truth of the evidence in relation to the hypothesis at issue. Having the bar of EN set at agreeing over the truth of propositions prevents many debates from ever getting off the ground. What is at issue may not get resolved under an ‘apodeictic’ reading of EN, but with the debate off the ground and the evidence agreed to in play the ability to make the other party accept a proposition as true depends on skill of argumentation. It depends on showing showing how one’s conclusion drawn from one’s interpretation of the evidence gets the other party something else they value. In such a case, the two parties are attempting to unseat enough propositions in the other’s theory set as to undermine each other’s theoretical commitments. This makes the dialectic more fluid and dynamic, as adjustments are made to both theory and evidence.
[1] Weatherson: 30-32 (http://brian.weatherson.org/ENw.pdf).
You’ve probably noticed that I’ve made some changes on this site. I decided to consolidate my blog and website. This site was formerly just my blog “Justice and Justification”. The site is now titled after my name, but I will continue to write blog posts. To inaugurate this change I will be posting over the next several weeks on Chapter 7 of Williamson’s Philosophy of Philosophy. There are 7 sections in chapter 7. I hope to post each week on a new section. This chapter looks at evidence in philosophy. I’ve read the chapter several times and look forward to summarizing and commenting on the chapter. You’re welcome to read-along and comment…think of it as a mini-online book club.
I am now the editor of the Moral Epistemology category on the PhilPapers website. Feel free to pass along any articles that could go under this category. I am responsible for organizing and populating this category with relevant research.
I’ve been thinking about two ways of understanding epistemic intuitions. The first view is the liberal view. This is the view proposed by Williamson, Ichikawa, Lewis and Van Inwagen. On this view intuitions are judgments or inclinations to judge. The motivation for this view is that it avoids psychologizing evidence. If intuitions are judgments, then they are not basic sources of evidence. They are more like acts of affirming a proposition rather than basic sources of evidence for the content of a proposition. The second view of intuitions is the restrictive view. According to this view intuitions are a special class of mental states and these mental states are capable of serving as evidence for the propositional content they represent.
In thinking about these two views it occurred to me that it is possible to adopt and adapt a distinction from moral philosophy. Consider reframing these two views in roughly the following way:
- Non-cognitivism (liberal): Intuitions do not evidence the truth of propositions. Intuitions are akin to attitudes of affirmation of propositional content, but they do not count as basic sources of evidence for that content. Intuitions have no truth conditions; they are more like utterances “Yes, that P” or “I agree that P.” Intuitions are attitudes of desire, approval or disapproval.
- Cognitivism (restrictive): Intuitions are states of mind (i.e., cognitive like beliefs are cognitive). Intuitions are able to evidence the truth or falsity of propositions. So, intuitions are capable of being basic sources of evidence.
Cast in this light, what can the debate over epistemic intuitions learn from the debate over the truth-value of moral propositions? Does this recasting of the debate over epistemic intuitions sharpen what is at stake?
I am working on a response paper to a Phil Studies paper by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux(henceforth, E & M). Their paper is found here.
In “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe” E & M argue intuitions do not play an evidential role. This thesis targets a particular dialectic. E & M recognize a false presupposition in the debate over whether intuitions should or should not play an evidential role. The false presupposition is that intuitions play an evidential role. Against this assumption E & M argue that intuitions do not in fact play an evidential role. They argue for this claim irrespective of whether or not intuitions should play such a role. Intuition-proponents claim intuitions are evidence, so they should play an evidential role. Intuition-opponents claim intuitions are not evidence, so they should not play an evidential role. Assumed within this dialectic is the idea that intuitions play an evidential role. Negating this assumption E & M appear to be putting forward a dialectic-changing thesis.[1] E & M’s thesis promises to generate new lines of research, overcome an exhausted debate that seems to run in circles, and better systematize the data of why intuitions appear to be used as evidence in philosophy but actually fail to be used as such. In my paper “Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe” I argue against E & M’s thesis at length.
In this post, I propose a truncated argument against E & M’s overall thesis, an argument which is not found in my paper. Consider:
- Intuitions cannot play an evidential role (ER) in philosophical inquiry (E & M’s 1st thesis).
- A non-evidential view explains why intuitions seem to play an ER even though they do not (E & M’s 2nd thesis).
- It is possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (E & M assumption).
- Philosophers think intuitions should or should not play an ER in relation to the evidential status (ES) of intuitions.[2]
- E & M argue intuitions cannot play an ER by arguing intuitions are not-E (1 & 2). [3]
- Thus, it is not possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (~3).
Is this a viable argument against E & M’s position? At first glance, it seems to undercut E & M’s method of argument without getting into the details of their proposal. I address the details of their proposal in my paper.
[1] This highlights the importance of arguing against E & M’s thesis. If it cannot be successfully defeated, whole modes of inquiry in philosophy need to be reevaluated or abandoned as futile.
[2] Philosophers argue intuitions should play an ER because they’re E or intuitions should not play and ER because they’re not-E.
[3] E & M must argue intuitions are not playing an ER and they’re not-E. If they said intuitions are not-ER and did not argue intuitions are not-E their position could be the inert view (not-ER, but E). This is a view E & M want to avoid. The move they do make takes a stand on the epistemic status of intuitions, namely, they have a negative ES (they’re not-E).
Jonathan Ichikawa put forward an interesting idea on “intuitions as enablers” at the Arché Methodology blog. Access the discussion on this idea by clicking here.
I just discovered a conference concerning the value of knowledge and responsible belief. Full details here. Conference theme and keynote speakers found below.
Conference Theme
The ethics of belief and the phenomenon of disagreement are two epistemological topics that show an interesting revival during the last few decades. This conference aims to draw the two issues together: What is it to acquire or hold responsible belief on some issue if that issue is the subject of (fierce) controversy? How does the existence of (known) disagreement affect the epistemic status of our beliefs? And what sort of cognitive response is appropriate when one is confronted with opposed views on a subject matter considered? Some of the key questions and issues to be considered in this area include: Are we responsible for what we believe? If so, in what sense and if not, why do we often talk as if we are? Is there an ‘ethics of belief’? What are the norms, principles, obligations, and permissions that might constitute an ethics of belief? Are we to take responsibility for our beliefs and what does that amount to? Are beliefs in any sense under our voluntary control? Is our having responsibility for what we believe compatible with doxastic involuntarism? What is disagreement? Is there faultless disagreement? What is responsible belief when confronted with disagreement among one’s peers? What is responsible belief in the face of testimony to the contrary? Is belief in the face of disagreement ever responsible if one’s evidence is inconclusive?
Keynote Speakers
- Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
- Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
- Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)
- René van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam)
