Conference Theme

The ethics of belief and the phenomenon of disagreement are two epistemological topics that show an interesting revival during the last few decades. This conference aims to draw the two issues together: What is it to acquire or hold responsible belief on some issue if that issue is the subject of (fierce) controversy? How does the existence of (known) disagreement affect the epistemic status of our beliefs? And what sort of cognitive response is appropriate when one is confronted with opposed views on a subject matter considered? Some of the key questions and issues to be considered in this area include: Are we responsible for what we believe? If so, in what sense and if not, why do we often talk as if we are? Is there an ‘ethics of belief’? What are the norms, principles, obligations, and permissions that might constitute an ethics of belief? Are we to take responsibility for our beliefs and what does that amount to? Are beliefs in any sense under our voluntary control? Is our having responsibility for what we believe compatible with doxastic involuntarism? What is disagreement? Is there faultless disagreement? What is responsible belief when confronted with disagreement among one’s peers? What is responsible belief in the face of testimony to the contrary? Is belief in the face of disagreement ever responsible if one’s evidence is inconclusive?

Keynote Speakers

• Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
• Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
• Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)
• René van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam)