• 7.1: Evidence Neutrality
• 7.2: Argument Against Intuitions
• 7.3: Judgment Skepticism
• 7.4: The Judgment Skeptic’s Mistake
• 7.5.1: Traditional Skepticism
• 7.5.2: More on Evidence Neutrality
• 7.6: Epistemic Conservatism
• 7.7: Reflective Equilibrium

While I cannot guarantee the rate at which I’ll post I can guarantee that I’ll go in order. I discovered the debate by looking at the Brueckner and Buford (2010) paper in the current issue of Analysis. This led me to trace the debate backwards, which started with Baumann’s PPR paper “Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.”

The distinction is: provide vs. consist. Williamson uses this distinction to mention an objection to his view that all evidence is propositional. For Williamson even perceptual experiences, which are often regarded as non-propositional evidence, consist of propositions. An objector might claim: “Experiences provide evidence; they do not consist of propositions” (197, italics mine). However, only propositions we grasp can be used in confirmation, inference to the best explanation, and choice between rival hypotheses. Even though words fail to completely capture perceptual experience it does not mean evidence is non-propositional. Instead, experience makes propositions e₁…e_n count as evidence for a hypothesis h. Having an experience bestows the status of evidence on propositions. As such, evidence is inextricably linked to (and mediated by) propositions. Thus, experience consists of propositions.

It is possible to ask the same thing of epistemic reasons and evidence: Are they inextricably linked? There are defenders of two theses concerning this question:

• Inseparable:  Where you find one you find the other (i.e., reasons and evidence serve the same function, appear under the same analysis, or are constitutionally equivalent).
  • For every proposition p, if p is a reason R then p is evidence E.
• Separable: Reasons and evidence come apart (i.e., in some scenarios you have reasons but no evidence, and vice versa).
  • There is some p such that p is an R but not an E.

Now I’ll relate this to the provide/consist distinction. One way of arguing for Inseparable is by claiming ‘having’ evidence for the truth of p ‘provides’ you with an epistemic reason for believing p. In response one might argue for Separable by showing evidence for p doesn’t always generate a reason to believe p. A strategy to counter this move is to claim the evidence for p is not really (good) evidence for p. What is taken as evidence for p doesn’t ‘consist’ of evidence; it doesn’t have the status of evidence because its status is undercut by other pieces of evidence.  These moves have the following assumptions:

• Pro-Inseparable: If you have good evidence for p, then you have a good epistemic reason for believing p.
• Pro-Separable: Rejects the assumption endorsed by Pro-Inseparable.

Pro-Inseparable claims ‘providing’ sanctions ‘believing’. ‘Believing’ connects to ‘consisting’ in that one is ‘believing’ appropriately if that believing is based on that which has the status (consists) of good evidence (reasons). By transitivity ‘providing’ sanctions ‘consisting’.  A way to argue for Pro-Separable is to show you can have good evidence for p without that evidence grounding a good reason for believing p because the reason is not based on the evidence. As a result, it’s not the case where you have good evidence you always have a good epistemic reason. The epistemic reason needs to be appropriately linked to the evidence to result in ‘believing’ in a way that’s sufficient for the belief to be justified. Simply claiming the two entities are inextricably linked (i.e., where you find one you find the other) doesn’t secure this connection. There’s another way of putting this point.

‘Providing’ focuses on the function of evidence or how it’s used in an argument. Williamson takes this line by arguing evidence ‘is’ (consists) only in so far as it ‘functions’ (provides). For evidence (experience) to play its evidentiary role within an argument it must be propositional. Because experience functionally provides evidence for hypotheses, and evidence must be propositionally grasped in order to be used, experience consists of propositions. Williamson argues for ‘consists’ by way of ‘provides’. The problem with this is that something may ‘consist’ without ‘providing’. I can be justified in believing that p even if no agent has engaged in the activity (function) of justification. This is because p’s status as evidence justifies believing in p in a way that doesn’t depend on anyone having used it in argumentation. It doesn’t require that the evidence is possessed, grasped, or used. That it can only ‘function’ a certain way if it ‘is’ a certain way simply shows that ‘function’ (provide) depends on ‘status’ (consist). It doesn’t show that ‘consist’ can be derived from ‘provide’ when it comes to evidence.

• S knows that p = S has a justified, true belief that p, and there is no true proposition e such that the conjunction of e and S’s actual evidence set E does not constitute a justification for S to believe that p (169).

Neta defends the IJTB account of knowledge by showing it can properly handle a battery of cases where non-knowledge gets counted as knowledge. I’ll leave those details to the reader and fast-forward to a part in Neta’s paper that Williamson takes issue with.

Are there counterexamples against IJTB? One counterexample is found in Williamson (2000: 219). This counterexample involves a person putting one black and one red ball into a bag (e), making 10K draws and getting a red ball every time (e’), resulting in rationally doubting whether a black ball was really put in the bag and not just a red ball made to look black by a trick of lighting. The initial knowledge is defeated by future evidence. Thus, knowledge seems defeasible.

But, not so fast says Neta. There are many ways the additional evidence (e’) can interact with the person’s beliefs: (i) the belief that p is true is lost, (ii) some of the initial evidence for p is lost, (iii) being able to reasonably form the belief that p on the basis of one’s evidence is lost. A person might lose knowledge that p in any of these ways. This is not a problem for IJTB because, “IJTB says nothing about what would happen to our epistemic subject if she were to gain an additional bit of evidence. It says that, if S knows that p, then, for any true proposition e’, the conjunction of our subject’s actual evidence set with e’ constitutes a justification for our subject to believe that p.” (171) For Neta, infallibility entails indefeasibility because, “Knowledge…is belief that is properly based on infallible evidence (indeed, on evidence that can be known—perhaps upon reflection alone—to be infallible)” (354). This means that a subject can know p only based on infallible evidence for p.

Williamson points out a fallacy in Neta’s argument for the idea that S knows that p only when it’s based on infallible evidence for p. It’s possible to deduce, according to Neta, from the assumption that S knows p on the basis of e that e is not misleading evidence for p. This makes a disjunction hold: either the subject can know the evidence is not misleading based on some further, independent, evidence e’ or e is infallible evidence for p. According to Neta the first disjunct leads to a regress because it’s possible to know that e & e’ are not misleading with regard to p, and this can be known based on further, independent, evidence e”, and so on. Williamson counters this assumption by saying it only shows that all cases of the first disjunct cannot be true, but it is possible that some cases are true. The result is that only some of the time the second disjunct is true, namely, in cases when the first disjunct is false. This does not show that the second disjunct is true all the time because, as Neta argues, the first disjunct is always false because it generates an infinite regress. According to Williamson the following is quite possible:

S knows that e is not misleading with respect to p on the basis of evidence e’ distinct from e; e is fallible evidence for p; S does not know that e & e’ is not misleading with respect to p on the basis of evidence e” distinct from e & e’; e & e’ is infallible evidence for p. (354).

So, it’s possible for e to be fallible evidence for p, yet for S to know p on the basis of e (i.e. when e is conjoined with e’). Williamson launches his second wave of attack against the assumption of entailment between infallibility and indefeasibility. If the evidence is infallible, then it’s the case that if S knows p on the basis of e, then p is true; possessing the evidence guarantees the truth of the belief. However, according to both Neta and Williamson’s views, the subject may not (and need not) be in a position to access or reason to the truth of the belief. So, even knowing that e is infallible evidence for p, it’s not clear that this entails indefeasible justification for p. Simply knowing that e is infallible does not entail that, “the conjunction of e with anything should constitute a justification for S to believe p” (355). It seems Williamson missed Neta’s disclaimer about justification, as Neta confides:

[T]here may be examples in which S is justified in believing that p on the basis of evidence that can be expanded into something that is not a justification for S to believe that p—justification itself may be defeasible. But knowledge is not defeasible, according to the IJTB theory (180).

Neta leaves justification as an outstanding, perhaps defeasible, position to develop. Williamson’s comments do bring out a worry with Neta’s account. Neta is committed to epistemic dogmatism. In fact, he embraces dogmatism. As long as an agent maintains her current evidence for her knowledge that p, future evidence will never justify disbelief in p. Being dogmatic about belief that p is OK because there is no epistemic cost, reasons Neta. Holding p as a settled belief and continuing to believe p in the face of new evidence, as long as one does not lose one’s current evidence, allows one to rationally continue knowing that p. What does it mean to lose evidence? If a true proposition in one’s evidence set becomes false it falls out of the evidence set. Beliefs once true can become false in light of new evidence (i.e. true evidence may falsify other true evidence once added to the evidence set). This means one must account for future evidence because it can cause one to lose one’s current evidence for the belief, and may, as a result, justify disbelief in p. Unless Neta embraces a view that factivity is absolute (i.e. once true, always true), it seems a cost of Neta’s view is that it sanctions a conflict: retaining evidence allows one to keep belief irrespective of future evidence, yet one can lose one’s evidence in the face of future evidence and so future evidence  can significantly impact one’s current evidence. It seems: future evidence is no big deal with respect to one’s current evidence and yet a big deal with respect to one’s current evidence. Which is it?

• Knowledge channel/methodology X (e.g. RE, judgment skepticism, epistemic conservatism) relies on psychological facts (beliefs).
• X assumes those beliefs are unproblematic.
• However, those beliefs are problematic (i.e. access to the beliefs is problematic, X cannot explain/defend the beliefs).
• So, X must be abandoned as a knowledge channel/methodology because X’s reliance on psychological facts is problematic.

In working through chapter 7 I have realized that Williamson keeps reapplying the reasoning above to different philosophical methodologies (1). However, there is something right about this reasoning. It is beneficial to the enterprise of philosophy to spotlight methodologies relying on unexamined  assumptions. It is correct to label methodologies as problematic pending further defense of those assumptions. Williamson makes this point in connection with RE:

[O]ne has no basis for an epistemological assessment of the method of reflective equilibrium in philosophy without more information about the epistemological status of the “intuitions.” In particular, it matters what kind of evidence “intuitions” provide (2007: 244).

RE must defend the intuitions it relies on. The epistemic status of intuitions (as inputs in the RE process) must be elaborated. Based on his comments it seems Williamson is unaware that the literature on RE contains accounts addressing the epistemic status of considered moral judgments (i.e. RE’s version of intuitions). Some philosophers hold that intuitions constitute evidence like observations in science do. If this is the case, then ”observed facts are sometimes relevant evidence,” as Williamson objects, and this is no problem for RE. There are, however, problems with the analogy between intuitions and observation reports. I address these issues within the RE literature in the first half of my thesis. In the second half of my thesis I provide a positive account of the epistemic status of intuitions. It is my hope that this account can establish the evidential value of intuitions and directly address the concern Williamson raises. This makes it reasonable to rely on intuitions within RE methodology, as within RE are found the tools for explaining and defending the status of intuitions as evidence.

Notes

(1) I wonder if this way of thinking pervades the entire book. If so, what seems like a dynamic tome on philosophical methodology reduces to a one trick pony (i.e. externalism is true, or internalism is false).

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P.S. I will be on a brief hiatus from blogging. I am in the process of moving (fun, fun, fun). Also, I am trying to decide what kind of posting to do next. I will likely take a break from commenting on a chapter from a book and proceed on a topic-by-topic basis. Though, I must admit, I am tempted to tackle some of Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence. I am still kicking around that possibility.

(PEC): If S believes that p and p is not incoherent, then S is justified in retaining the belief that p and S remains justified in believing that p so long as p is not defeated for S.

PEC captures the notion that one has a defeasible right to one’s beliefs. One loses one’s right to one’s beliefs given two conditions of defeat:

(DC1): If S has better reasons for believing that ∼p than S’s reasons for believing that p, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.

(DC2): If S has reasons for believing that ∼p which are as good as S’s reasons for believing that p and the belief that ∼p coheres equally as well or better than the belief that p does with S’s other beliefs, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.

Given PEC, the justification for believing p is analogous to the justification that S’s lacking a defeater provides. Lacking a defeater provides some justification, but it does not count as part of S’s reasons for believing. As McCain mentions, “S’s justification for believing that p is bolstered by her believing that p, but her belief that p does not count among her reasons for believing that p” (2008: 187). In short, belief that p cannot be used as a reason for believing that p. In a situation where S has another belief (or inclination to believe) that is inconsistent with p, S cannot use her believing that p as a reason to continue believing p. DC1 indicates that reasons for believing that ~p can act as defeaters and eliminate S’s justification for believing that p. DC2 indicates that if reasons for believing that ~p rival reasons for believing that p, and the belief that ~p coheres better with S’s other beliefs, then S has lost her justification for believing that p.

Williamson mentions that if intuitions are beliefs then they fall under epistemic conservatism. Do inclinations to believe also give one a defeasible right to one’s beliefs? What does epistemic conservatism council one to do when one has an inclination to believe something that is inconsistent with a belief one is currently committed to? Williamson uses a Gettier scenario to show that one cannot use an inclination to believe to arrive at a new belief. One can be inclined to believe something without believing it, and inclinations can conflict. When an inclination to believe something conflicts with a currently held belief, then, given epistemic conservatism, the currently held belief can be retained. Williamson (2007) arrives at this conclusion by claiming:

If I currently believe p, I am currently committed to the belief that any inclination to believe something inconsistent with p is an inclination to believe something false. I am not committed to the beliefs I am merely inclined to have in the way I am committed to my current beliefs (p. 243).

Given the PEC/DC1/DC2 package, an inclination to believe something inconsistent with a currently held belief (p), namely ~p,  can serve as a reason to believe that ~p. That one believes that p cannot be used as a positive reason for retaining the belief that p in the face of reasons against that belief. Conservatism does not commit one to dogmatism. Simply because p is a belief (or because it is believed), and the reason to believe that ~p is arrived at via an inclination to believe, does not warrant retaining the belief that p. The inclination counts as a reason to favor ~p, so it is a potential defeater that must be overcome by reasons in favor of retaining p. Williamson does not offer any. What Williamson argues is that because an inclination is not fully believed it is not enough to overcome a belief that is actually believed or firmly believed. Williamson uses that fact that p is believed as a reason to retain p, which is a violation of PEC.

By contrast, what Williamson needs to argue is that an inclination to believe that ~p is not a reason that trumps the reasons in favor of believing that p. However, as the case is currently constructed, Williamson is not able to do this. In the Gettier case Williamson describes the reason Justin has for believing that knowledge is equal to justified true belief is that “Justin has been brought up to believe” that JTB theory is true. Is familial inculcation a reason for believing p that trumps the intuition that when presented with a Gettier case Justin judges that the Gettier subject has a JTB without knowledge? If anything, familial inculcation is often cited as a source of bias, blind belief and wishful thinking in the face of contrary evidence. This suggests that the inclination to believe that ~p, which is formed when presented with the Gettier case, is stronger than the reasons Williamson presents for favoring the belief that p. Thus, the intuition can serve as a defeater in this case, and epistemic conservatism councils Justin to abandon his inculcated belief and move to the new belief that the subject in the Gettier case has a JTB without knowledge or that JTB theory is false.

In the last half of section 5 Williamson goes into a discussion on the dialectical standard of evidence. Again, Williamson is trying to address the judgment skeptic. This view of evidence avoids the trap of resorting to psychological facts to try and resolve disputes about the evidence. In a dialectical context evidence is that which is uncontroversial in that debate or context. Evidence does not have to be foundational or uncontroversial across all contexts. Instead, it only needs to be uncontroversial in that context; if inquirers can agree over what counts as evidence, then what they agree on counts as evidence in that context. Williamson finds this view of evidence wanting because it results in conceding too much to the skeptic. Accepting as evidence only propositions that are true if one is a BIV, in order to have meaningful debate with the skeptic, does not have to lead one to a wholesale acceptance of skepticism about the external world. However, according to Williamson, giving the skeptic his or her premises forces one into a conclusion that one does not endorse. If one does not play the skeptic’s game, then the dialectical standard of evidence ends up being irrelevant. Another possibility is to switch to a non-dialectical standard. Given this standard the fact challenged by the skeptic is not disqualified as evidence. For example, one might take the fact that a Gettier subject lacks knowledge or the fact that there are mountains in Switzerland as evidence even though these facts are contentious to the skeptic. To ignore these facts is to violate the Carnapian total evidence requirement. Williamson wonders if such a move is a legitimate response to judgment skepticism?

Williamson’s conclusion is that we need to widen our evidential base. Even if intuitions were the most reliable forms of evidence it does not follow that we should restrict our evidence to just intuitions. Facts that the judgment skeptic hold as highly probable (in contrast to contentious facts about the existence of mountains) are not to be the only facts considered. We do not need to play the skeptic’s game just because she holds that only facts that are certain (because they align with the micro-physical structure of the universe) can be admitted as evidence. According to Williamson there is nothing wrong with continuing to claim knowledge of truths in contention. The “dialectic” is not the measure of all things. As Williamson says:

No methodology is proof against misapplication by those with sufficiently poor judgment.

It is not the job of good methodology to silence all people who propose, for instance, astrological predictions as truths. Instead, good methodology must separate good from bad intellectual practices. I imagine Williamson thinks he is doing this by contributing to the literature on philosophical methodology, by uncovering things like the consequence fallacy and other ways methodology goes astray. This is a useful endeavor, but because of Williamson’s clear bias for knowledge-first epistemology, epistemic externalism and a whole host of other theoretical commitments in analyticity, assertion, and so on Williamson’s work could be accused of the very thing he is arguing against, namely, proposing an account of methodology to philosophy in general (even giving the book the sweeping title The Philosophy of Philosophy) in a way that is highly uncontentiously decidable and violates the total evidence requirement by primarily using evidence from Gettier cases and revisionary metaphysics. As I have studied chapter 7 in POP I have kept coming back to inconsistencies between the content Williamson is arguing for and the methodology he is using in arguing for it. I’d be curious to know if anyone else has noticed the same inconsistencies.

1. Evidence is true (assumption).
2. The proposition that I have hands (p) is not evidence in a skeptical scenario because it is false (given 1).
3. According to the skeptic it is contentious that I am not in the skeptical scenario (assumption).
4. So, it is contentious that p is evidence (2,3).
5. Therefore, given the Evidence Neutrality (EN) thesis, p is not evidence (EN,4).
6. Only the proposition that it appears to me that I have hands (p*) is evidence (assumption).
7. Since both the common sense scenario and the skeptical scenario are consistent with all my evidence I cannot regard the former scenario as more probable than the latter (skeptical conclusion).

The moral of the story for Williamson is that the traditional skeptic can use EN, which is defined and explored in this post, to make it the case that the skeptical scenario cannot be ruled out; thus, it is not the case that I know I have hands or that the external world exists. One problem I have with Williamson’s formulation of the argument is the transition from p to p*. In 2, the proposition p is false because in the skeptical scenario it falsely appears to me that I have hands. My experience of hands is just an induced delusion at the hands of a mad scientist or an architect of The Matrix. In 6, the proposition p* is true. How can p be false because it falsely appears to me that I have hands and p* be true because it appears to me that I have hands? Is not falsely appearing the same as apperances being false? Even though in the skeptical scenario it is true to me that it appears that I have hands I cannot use that psychological fact to satisfy EN because it is contentious that p* is true because it falsely appears to me that I have hands. In the skeptical scenario p* is false as well as p.

Another feature of the argument I find puzzling is the jump from 5 to 6. Even if p is not evidence it is not clear that the only option for finding a proposition that can count as evidence is to resort to psychological claims. Even if, as I explained above, the shift from p to p* fails because p* is also false it is not clear that the only option for looking for true propositions is by turning inward. In a scenario like The Matrix there are glitches in the system that clue people, like Neo, into the fact that reality is not what it seems. A skeptic who uses a Matrix-type scenario can search for evidence in propositions about glitches in the fabric of space-time or computer-coded reality. In The Animatrix these things include:

a section of the house where it’s raining, cans that float in mid-air, doors that go nowhere, and best of all the characters get to slow down time and do leaps and twirls reminiscent of someone who’s jacked into the Matrix knowing how to bend its rules. http://www.thematrix101.com/animatrix/beyond.php

Williamson could make 6 a disjunction: the skeptic must use either a true proposition that exposes the falsehood of appearances or a proposition about appearances. Because propositions about appearances are not true (and only truths count as evidence) this forces the skeptic to use, for example, a proposition that cans float in mid-air (p**) as evidence that the skeptical scenario cannot be ruled out. This makes it the case that no matter which way the skeptic turns she cannot get her conclusion that the common sense scenario and the skeptical scenario are equally probable conditional on one’s evidence. This blocks the use of EN to generate traditional skepticism, which is not a bad thing because it is not clear that traditional skeptics endorse anything like “uncontentious decidability” among a community of inquirers. The traditional skeptic cannot and need not psychologize evidence.

There are two mistakes that Williamson identifies. The first mistake is the use of so-called appearance principles, and the second mistake is committing the consequence fallacy. I will discuss each of these mistakes in turn.

An appearance principle is defined as follows:

[O]ne should be confident that P (on the basis of common sense) only if its appearing (by the standards of common sense) that P is good evidence that P. (2007: 227)

Williamson shows that appearance principles can be used as premises in an argument for general skepticism as well as judgment skepticism. This is a problem because judgment skeptics want to exclude the results of particle physics from skepticism so that they can claim underlying micro-physical events entail the impossibility of mountains. I will provide you with an overview of Williamson’s argument.

Let SS be the judgment skeptic’s scenario in which there are no mountains. In this scenario it falsely appears that there are mountains even though mountains are a metaphysical impossibility. If there really are mountains, then SS must not obtain. For the judgment skeptic: one should be confident that SS does not obtain only if its appearing that SS does not obtain is good evidence that SS does not obtain. However, appearing that SS does not obtain is not good evidence that SS does not obtain, according to the judgment skeptic, so one should have low confidence (in one’s judgment) that SS does not obtain. Now, I turn to a distinction.

Roughly, something is truth-indicative if the appearance of it raises the probability of P. If, on the other hand, appearance (used as a conditional on P) does not raise the probability of P above the probability of P alone, then appearance is falsity-indicative. Appearance principles require one to modulate one’s confidence in P according to how appearance that P provides evidence that P, and only if the appearance of P is truth-indicative should one be highly confident in P.

The use of appearance principles in the reasoning above can also generate general skepticism. Let p be a description of the external world that jives with the judgment skeptic’s understanding of particle physics. Imagine SS* is an evil demon scenario in which p is false but an evil demon makes the truth of p seem to hold. By the same reasoning, the appearance that SS* does not obtain is not evidence that SS* does not obtain (i.e., it is not truth-indicative) because appearances to a subject are systematically deceived by the demon. So, given the appearance principle, one should have low confidence that SS* does not obtain. Because p (the existence of the external world) entails that SS* does not obtain, then one should modulate one’s confidence in p to accord with one’s confidence that SS* does not obtain. The result is that confidence in p should be low even when its appearance raises the probability of p. So, we should be skeptical about the existence of the external world as described by particle physics. Williamson cuts the legs out from under the judgment skeptic’s reasoning. Or, does he?

I’m not satisfied with Williamson’s pattern of pulling the judgment skeptic into general skepticism. Why? The mere possibility of an evil demon scenario precludes the use of appearance principles. In such a scenario appearances are false and, consequently, apperance principles do not hold. Who would reasonably argue that in a Matrix world one should be confident that P only if it appears that P is good evidence that P? By the assumptions of the scenario it appearing that P will not be good evidence that P. So, to argue that appearance principles used in such a scenario result in skepticism about a domain judgment skeptics endorse (particle physics) seems like a ticky-tacky move at best and unwarranted at worst.

The second mistake in judgment skepticism is the consequence fallacy. This fallacy involves criticizing confidence in a theory by focusing on a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. Take the following argument Williamson outlines (2007: 233):

1. Physical events occur that folk geography takes to constitute the presence of mountains in Switzerland.
2. If physical events occur that folk geography takes to constitutes the presence of mountains in Switzerland, then there are mountains in Switzerland.
3. There are mountains in Switzerland.

A person who subscribes to folk geography is likely to endorses the whole argument. However, a judgment skeptic jumps off the boat at premise 2. That is, the evidence may increase the probability of premise 1 but not premise 2. The fallacy comes from arguing that the failure of increased probability in 2, conditional on the evidence, is reason to hold that a high degree of confidence in both 2 and 3 is not warranted. It may be that it is still reasonable to hold a high degree of confidence in 2 and 3 even though evidence raises the probability of 1 but not of 2. The problem comes from, “identifying a logical consequence of the theory (not itself a logical truth) whose probability is not raised by the evidence” (2007:232). It is not the case that evidence raising the probability of a hypothesis makes more probable a logical consequence of that hypothesis. In fact, according to Williamson, when the evidence makes the hypothesis more probable, but not certain, it decreases the probability of the logical consequence of the hypothesis. When evidence makes a hypothesis certain it does not make a logical consequence of that hypothesis more probable. Thus, evidence making more probable premise 1 but not 2 is not a basis from which to argue that one is not entitled to a high degree of confidence in premise 2 and 3.

Williamson’s logical consequence point brings up issues in confirmation theory. His point has prompted me to explore confirmation theory in more detail. Some useful reads in this regard can be found here and here.