• Knowledge channel/methodology X (e.g. RE, judgment skepticism, epistemic conservatism) relies on psychological facts (beliefs).
• X assumes those beliefs are unproblematic.
• However, those beliefs are problematic (i.e. access to the beliefs is problematic, X cannot explain/defend the beliefs).
• So, X must be abandoned as a knowledge channel/methodology because X’s reliance on psychological facts is problematic.

In working through chapter 7 I have realized that Williamson keeps reapplying the reasoning above to different philosophical methodologies (1). However, there is something right about this reasoning. It is beneficial to the enterprise of philosophy to spotlight methodologies relying on unexamined  assumptions. It is correct to label methodologies as problematic pending further defense of those assumptions. Williamson makes this point in connection with RE:

[O]ne has no basis for an epistemological assessment of the method of reflective equilibrium in philosophy without more information about the epistemological status of the “intuitions.” In particular, it matters what kind of evidence “intuitions” provide (2007: 244).

RE must defend the intuitions it relies on. The epistemic status of intuitions (as inputs in the RE process) must be elaborated. Based on his comments it seems Williamson is unaware that the literature on RE contains accounts addressing the epistemic status of considered moral judgments (i.e. RE’s version of intuitions). Some philosophers hold that intuitions constitute evidence like observations in science do. If this is the case, then ”observed facts are sometimes relevant evidence,” as Williamson objects, and this is no problem for RE. There are, however, problems with the analogy between intuitions and observation reports. I address these issues within the RE literature in the first half of my thesis. In the second half of my thesis I provide a positive account of the epistemic status of intuitions. It is my hope that this account can establish the evidential value of intuitions and directly address the concern Williamson raises. This makes it reasonable to rely on intuitions within RE methodology, as within RE are found the tools for explaining and defending the status of intuitions as evidence.

Notes

(1) I wonder if this way of thinking pervades the entire book. If so, what seems like a dynamic tome on philosophical methodology reduces to a one trick pony (i.e. externalism is true, or internalism is false).

—–

P.S. I will be on a brief hiatus from blogging. I am in the process of moving (fun, fun, fun). Also, I am trying to decide what kind of posting to do next. I will likely take a break from commenting on a chapter from a book and proceed on a topic-by-topic basis. Though, I must admit, I am tempted to tackle some of Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence. I am still kicking around that possibility.

(PEC): If S believes that p and p is not incoherent, then S is justified in retaining the belief that p and S remains justified in believing that p so long as p is not defeated for S.

PEC captures the notion that one has a defeasible right to one’s beliefs. One loses one’s right to one’s beliefs given two conditions of defeat:

(DC1): If S has better reasons for believing that ∼p than S’s reasons for believing that p, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.

(DC2): If S has reasons for believing that ∼p which are as good as S’s reasons for believing that p and the belief that ∼p coheres equally as well or better than the belief that p does with S’s other beliefs, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.

Given PEC, the justification for believing p is analogous to the justification that S’s lacking a defeater provides. Lacking a defeater provides some justification, but it does not count as part of S’s reasons for believing. As McCain mentions, “S’s justification for believing that p is bolstered by her believing that p, but her belief that p does not count among her reasons for believing that p” (2008: 187). In short, belief that p cannot be used as a reason for believing that p. In a situation where S has another belief (or inclination to believe) that is inconsistent with p, S cannot use her believing that p as a reason to continue believing p. DC1 indicates that reasons for believing that ~p can act as defeaters and eliminate S’s justification for believing that p. DC2 indicates that if reasons for believing that ~p rival reasons for believing that p, and the belief that ~p coheres better with S’s other beliefs, then S has lost her justification for believing that p.

Williamson mentions that if intuitions are beliefs then they fall under epistemic conservatism. Do inclinations to believe also give one a defeasible right to one’s beliefs? What does epistemic conservatism council one to do when one has an inclination to believe something that is inconsistent with a belief one is currently committed to? Williamson uses a Gettier scenario to show that one cannot use an inclination to believe to arrive at a new belief. One can be inclined to believe something without believing it, and inclinations can conflict. When an inclination to believe something conflicts with a currently held belief, then, given epistemic conservatism, the currently held belief can be retained. Williamson (2007) arrives at this conclusion by claiming:

If I currently believe p, I am currently committed to the belief that any inclination to believe something inconsistent with p is an inclination to believe something false. I am not committed to the beliefs I am merely inclined to have in the way I am committed to my current beliefs (p. 243).

Given the PEC/DC1/DC2 package, an inclination to believe something inconsistent with a currently held belief (p), namely ~p,  can serve as a reason to believe that ~p. That one believes that p cannot be used as a positive reason for retaining the belief that p in the face of reasons against that belief. Conservatism does not commit one to dogmatism. Simply because p is a belief (or because it is believed), and the reason to believe that ~p is arrived at via an inclination to believe, does not warrant retaining the belief that p. The inclination counts as a reason to favor ~p, so it is a potential defeater that must be overcome by reasons in favor of retaining p. Williamson does not offer any. What Williamson argues is that because an inclination is not fully believed it is not enough to overcome a belief that is actually believed or firmly believed. Williamson uses that fact that p is believed as a reason to retain p, which is a violation of PEC.

By contrast, what Williamson needs to argue is that an inclination to believe that ~p is not a reason that trumps the reasons in favor of believing that p. However, as the case is currently constructed, Williamson is not able to do this. In the Gettier case Williamson describes the reason Justin has for believing that knowledge is equal to justified true belief is that “Justin has been brought up to believe” that JTB theory is true. Is familial inculcation a reason for believing p that trumps the intuition that when presented with a Gettier case Justin judges that the Gettier subject has a JTB without knowledge? If anything, familial inculcation is often cited as a source of bias, blind belief and wishful thinking in the face of contrary evidence. This suggests that the inclination to believe that ~p, which is formed when presented with the Gettier case, is stronger than the reasons Williamson presents for favoring the belief that p. Thus, the intuition can serve as a defeater in this case, and epistemic conservatism councils Justin to abandon his inculcated belief and move to the new belief that the subject in the Gettier case has a JTB without knowledge or that JTB theory is false.

In the last half of section 5 Williamson goes into a discussion on the dialectical standard of evidence. Again, Williamson is trying to address the judgment skeptic. This view of evidence avoids the trap of resorting to psychological facts to try and resolve disputes about the evidence. In a dialectical context evidence is that which is uncontroversial in that debate or context. Evidence does not have to be foundational or uncontroversial across all contexts. Instead, it only needs to be uncontroversial in that context; if inquirers can agree over what counts as evidence, then what they agree on counts as evidence in that context. Williamson finds this view of evidence wanting because it results in conceding too much to the skeptic. Accepting as evidence only propositions that are true if one is a BIV, in order to have meaningful debate with the skeptic, does not have to lead one to a wholesale acceptance of skepticism about the external world. However, according to Williamson, giving the skeptic his or her premises forces one into a conclusion that one does not endorse. If one does not play the skeptic’s game, then the dialectical standard of evidence ends up being irrelevant. Another possibility is to switch to a non-dialectical standard. Given this standard the fact challenged by the skeptic is not disqualified as evidence. For example, one might take the fact that a Gettier subject lacks knowledge or the fact that there are mountains in Switzerland as evidence even though these facts are contentious to the skeptic. To ignore these facts is to violate the Carnapian total evidence requirement. Williamson wonders if such a move is a legitimate response to judgment skepticism?

Williamson’s conclusion is that we need to widen our evidential base. Even if intuitions were the most reliable forms of evidence it does not follow that we should restrict our evidence to just intuitions. Facts that the judgment skeptic hold as highly probable (in contrast to contentious facts about the existence of mountains) are not to be the only facts considered. We do not need to play the skeptic’s game just because she holds that only facts that are certain (because they align with the micro-physical structure of the universe) can be admitted as evidence. According to Williamson there is nothing wrong with continuing to claim knowledge of truths in contention. The “dialectic” is not the measure of all things. As Williamson says:

No methodology is proof against misapplication by those with sufficiently poor judgment.

It is not the job of good methodology to silence all people who propose, for instance, astrological predictions as truths. Instead, good methodology must separate good from bad intellectual practices. I imagine Williamson thinks he is doing this by contributing to the literature on philosophical methodology, by uncovering things like the consequence fallacy and other ways methodology goes astray. This is a useful endeavor, but because of Williamson’s clear bias for knowledge-first epistemology, epistemic externalism and a whole host of other theoretical commitments in analyticity, assertion, and so on Williamson’s work could be accused of the very thing he is arguing against, namely, proposing an account of methodology to philosophy in general (even giving the book the sweeping title The Philosophy of Philosophy) in a way that is highly uncontentiously decidable and violates the total evidence requirement by primarily using evidence from Gettier cases and revisionary metaphysics. As I have studied chapter 7 in POP I have kept coming back to inconsistencies between the content Williamson is arguing for and the methodology he is using in arguing for it. I’d be curious to know if anyone else has noticed the same inconsistencies.

For Williamson (2004) an ‘intuition’ is arrived at through typical capacities for making judgments. In philosophy this involves the construction of thought experiments. A complex host of cognitive capacities are, for instance, used to arrive at the intuition that the Gettier subject does not know. These capacities include making modal judgments and making counterfactual conditional judgments. The judgment skeptic argues against these ‘armchair’ cognitive capacities. As Williamson mentions:

For judgment skeptics, appeals to intuition are nothing more than the last resort of dogmatic conservativism, in its desperate attempt to hold back the forward march of scientific and metaphysical progress. (2007: 223)

Williamson, as a defender of armchair practices, wants to defend the use of intuitions as he understands them.  He makes the following points against the judgment skeptic:

• Self-undermining: Scientific practice involves perceptual judgments. Judgment skeptical arguments apply to the use of microscopes, telescopes, and other instruments that magnify perceptual capacities but do not replace them. Observations including macroscopic objects threaten the use of such observations as evidence because they are grounded in the very common sense ontology skeptics are keen to argue against.
• Question Begging: Looking at judgment skepticism Williamson wonders, “what is the status of scientists’ evidential judgments?” When a scientist judges that a set of evidence best explains a theory, and then a judgment skeptic questions, “what evidence is there that our rankings of explanations are reliable?”, the scientist cannot avoid the charge of begging the question if she answers her rankings are reliable because they best explain another thing (e.g., survival of the species). Using empirical evidence to argue against folk theory does not remove the practices used to obtain the empirical evidence from exposure to judgment skeptical forms of argument.    

I’m not sure what I want to say about Williamson’s discussion. The points he makes against judgment skepticism seem valid and well-placed. In fact, I have more of a problem with Williamson’s characterization of intuitions as involving the application of routine capacities for judgment-making. Surely they involve such capacities, but I do not think they can be reduced to or dissolved into those capacities.

I’ll close by pointing you to a good discussion of Williamson (2004, 2005) in David Sosa’s article “Scepticism About Intuition.” Among other things, Sosa argues that intuitions play an illimitable epistemic role that cannot be reduced to ordinary capacities.

Philosophers might be better off not using the word “intuition” and its cognates. Their main current function is not to answer questions about the nature of the evidence on offer but to fudge them, by appearing to provide answers without really doing so (2007: 220).

The bumper sticker for Williamson’s argument could be: “intuitions are nothing special.” How does he reach the conclusion that intuitions fail to be distinctive and that they constitute “smoke and mirrors” methodology?

Williamson’s argument against intuitions is reductive. He explores various interpretations of intuitions and shows that each account can be reduced to routine forms of reasoning. Further, he argues that the use of intuitions in philosophy is pernicious. The practice is ineffective in answering philosophical questions and makes what philosophers do look like a scandal against rigor.

The context of this argument is Williamson’s argument against Evidence Neutrality (which I discuss here) and Williamson’s 2004 paper on intuitions (which is found in the journal dialectica). I will not rehearse those arguments, but as a rough summary of key considerations: intuitions are often taken to be evidence in philosophy, as evidence intuitions report psychological facts, Williamson is an externalist about mind, he wants to show that intuitions are not truly evidence, thus his favored understanding of evidence (as factive, not psychological) is unfazed by the misuse of the word “intuition” by philosophers. Put simply, intuition-speak is something philosophers engage in when they run out of arguments and want to try to make evidence uncontentiously decidable. Philosophers need to own up to the fact that evidence is always contestable. This last claim, of course, can be placed in the context of Knowledge and its Limits (i.e., one can know something without being in a position to know it). Now, I will raise problems with Williamson’s treatment of intuitions.

I claim that only if certain distinctions are misapplied or ignored can Williamson help himself to his conclusion to dump the use of “intution” in philosophy. Once certain distinctions are brought into focus his reductive project is thrown into relief.

Williamson’s strategy involves setting the target at intuition minimalists like Lewis (1983) and van Inwagen (1997). For them intuitions are mere opinions, beliefs or attractions to belief. There is nothing distinctive about such intuitions because even a field like science relies on some beliefs. The minimalist conception of intuitions is not distinctive of philosophical practice. If other approaches to intuitions can be show to be non-distinctive, then they can be reduced to the minimalist conception which shows that “intuitions are nothing special.”

When considering the rationalist conception of intuitions Williamson misapplies a distinction between the application of concepts and the grasp of concepts. For Williamson, application of concepts requires skills. Simply grasping concepts is insufficient because certain capacities are required to, for instance, correctly respond to the Gettier case. However, for rationalists like Bealer (1998), applying concepts to cases is part of the standard justificatory procedure. Capabilities for applying concepts to cases are not something separate or over-and-above what it means to correctly grasp concepts. Part of what it means to properly grasp a concept is having correctly applied the concepts to cases. A rationalist like Bealer would not claim that concept possession alone is sufficient, as Williamson implies. Such a reading stems from a misapplication of the application/possession distinction regarding conceptual analysis. As understood by rationalists, intuitions about cases are valuable because they clarify concepts of philosophical importance (e.g., knowledge and justice).

Williamson sharpens his attack against rationalists by looking at their interpretation of intuitions, as intellectual seemings analogous to perceptual seemings. Using the Muller-Lyer illusion as an example Williamson concedes that background information can defeat our inclination to view the two lines as incongruent. We can know how the illusion works and not be fooled. Yet, the richness of the phenomenology between intellectual and perceptual cases are not the same. Williamson argues much more appears to us perceptual when something seems the case versus intellectually when something seems the case. There is no seeming beyond our conscious inclinations to believe certain propositions. These inclinations to believe, however numerous, constitute our informational field. They are what we are justified in believing given our informational position. For example, the inclination to believe the Muller-Lyer lines are incongruent can only be reististed if we are in an informational situation that allows us to be justified in believing the lines are actually congruent, which consists in background knowledge about illusions. This brings up the distinction between situational justification and belief justification (Audi, 2003: 2-3), which seems to throw into relief Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology.

Belief justification is the positive status that attaches to beliefs which warrants us, as rational beings, in thinking the beliefs true. Belief justification is ground on situational justification and knowledge is not possible without justified beliefs. As Audi says:

We cannot have a justified belief without being in a position to have it. Without situational justification we are not in such a position (2003: 3).

So, Williamson cannot impose knowledge from top-down onto beliefs; rather, knowledge must be built-up by having belief justification ground on situational justification. Inclinations to believe can only be stably overridden by justified beliefs. Williamson is correct that feelings or seemings are not analogous in the perceptual and intellectual cases, but in both cases the defeat of inclinations requires an epistemology in contrast with the knowledge-first approach.

There are two other distinctions I think Williamson misses. The first is the distinction is between inferential and non-inferential reasoning. Williamson simply dismisses the possibility of intuitions as non-inferential beliefs. He does this by showing that his intuition examples are inferential in nature. This reduction of intuitions to the inferential variety fails to account for the possibility of intuitions stemming from non-inferential reasoning. Bart Streumer (2007: 3) mentions the following example of non-inferential reasoning:

(Belief:) The weather forecast predicts rain.
(Belief:) The sky is full of clouds.
So, (Belief:) There are reasons to believe that it is going to rain.

It is possible to form a non-inferential belief that there is reason to believe that it is going to rain. One might even intuit that it is going to rain through such a non-inferential process. Williamson seems to discount and dismiss the possibility of non-inferential intuitions without argument.

The last distinction I’ll consider is the difference between having an intuition that P and finding it intuitive that P. Williamson uses the example of revisionary metaphysicians who deny that mountains exist as an example that shows that philosophical practice does not always involve accepting what is intuitive and denying what is not. Such metaphysicians allow the proposition “there are no mountains” into their system because the theoretical upshots outweigh the cost of having to endorse a counterintuitive proposition. Some intuitions, such as complex propositions, may fail to be intuitive. That is, it may require additional reflection to see the truth of the proposition. A proposition might not always invoke a sense of non-inferential credibility, but it may nevertheless be known to be true (see Audi 2008). That some philosophers accept counterintuitive propositions does not show that intuitions fail. It just shows that intuitiveness cannot be equated to something being an intuition.

In thinking about these two views it occurred to me that it is possible to adopt and adapt a distinction from moral philosophy. Consider reframing these two views in roughly the following way:

• Non-cognitivism (liberal): Intuitions do not evidence the truth of propositions. Intuitions are akin to attitudes of affirmation of propositional content, but they do not count as basic sources of evidence for that content. Intuitions have no truth conditions; they are more like utterances “Yes, that P” or “I agree that P.” Intuitions are attitudes of desire, approval or disapproval.
• Cognitivism (restrictive): Intuitions are states of mind (i.e., cognitive like beliefs are cognitive). Intuitions are able to evidence the truth or falsity of propositions. So, intuitions are capable of being basic sources of evidence.

Cast in this light, what can the debate over epistemic intuitions learn from the debate over the truth-value of moral propositions? Does this recasting of the debate over epistemic intuitions sharpen what is at stake?

In “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe” E & M argue intuitions do not play an evidential role. This thesis targets a particular dialectic. E & M recognize a false presupposition in the debate over whether intuitions should or should not play an evidential role. The false presupposition is that intuitions play an evidential role. Against this assumption E & M argue that intuitions do not in fact play an evidential role. They argue for this claim irrespective of whether or not intuitions should play such a role. Intuition-proponents claim intuitions are evidence, so they should play an evidential role. Intuition-opponents claim intuitions are not evidence, so they should not play an evidential role. Assumed within this dialectic is the idea that intuitions play an evidential role. Negating this assumption E & M appear to be putting forward a dialectic-changing thesis.[1] E & M’s thesis promises to generate new lines of research, overcome an exhausted debate that seems to run in circles, and better systematize the data of why intuitions appear to be used as evidence in philosophy but actually fail to be used as such. In my paper “Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe” I argue against E & M’s thesis at length.

In this post, I propose a truncated argument against E & M’s overall thesis, an argument which is not found in my paper. Consider:

1. Intuitions cannot play an evidential role (ER) in philosophical inquiry (E & M’s 1^st thesis).
2. A non-evidential view explains why intuitions seem to play an ER even though they do not (E & M’s 2^nd thesis).
3. It is possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (E & M assumption).
4. Philosophers think intuitions should or should not play an ER in relation to the evidential status (ES) of intuitions.[2]
5. E & M argue intuitions cannot play an ER by arguing intuitions are not-E (1 & 2). [3]
6. Thus, it is not possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (~3).

Is this a viable argument against E & M’s position? At first glance, it seems to undercut E & M’s method of argument without getting into the details of their proposal. I address the details of their proposal in my paper.

[2] Philosophers argue intuitions should play an ER because they’re E or intuitions should not play and ER because they’re not-E.

[3] E & M must argue intuitions are not playing an ER and they’re not-E. If they said intuitions are not-ER and did not argue intuitions are not-E their position could be the inert view (not-ER, but E). This is a view E & M want to avoid. The move they do make takes a stand on the epistemic status of intuitions, namely, they have a negative ES (they’re not-E).

One of the presentations at the conference was Ernest Sosa on intuitions. I am somewhat of an intuition skeptic, but the way he outlined what an intuition is made it reasonable for me to believe there are such things as intellectual seemings. In a previous post, I mentioned the ambiguity of the term “weight” and how it, like other terms, is used loosely by the analytic community. I’d like to pick up on that thread and discuss the term as it relates to Sosa’s intuition project. Sosa identifies intuitions with seemings. A seeming is an attraction to assent (i.e. an attraction to affirm a proposition). Seemings come in two flavors: prima facie and ultima facie (or resultant). Seemings can conflict. Such is the case when one views a Muller-Lyer display and initially the lines seem incongruent. This prima facie seeming can conflict with the opposite seeming that the lines are in fact congruent.

Seemings can come by way of different sources. These sources might include testimony, empirical data, or intellectual data about what seems to be the case upon reflection. When there is a conflict between seemings, for example, that the Muller-Lyer lines are congruent and that they are incongruent the resultant seeming is determined by weighing the conflicting seemings. These conflicting seemings are weighed based on the sources of evidence that count in their favor. My question, then, is this:

• Is the weighing of evidence for a seeming agent-relative? 

Put differently, is there no objective way to determine how an agent should resolve the conflict of seemings or take certain evidence to be decisive? Even if a person has measured the lines and been told that the seeming incongruence of the lines is an illusion it is plausible that if all evidence is agent-relative in terms of how it is weighed, then the person could still have a resultant seeming of the incongruence of the lines (because they weighed the perceptual prima facie seeming of incongruence heavily) despite the amount of strong evidence to the contrary. If weighing of seemings is strictly agent-relative (i.e. there is no objective way of ranking evidence or saying more evidence of a certain sort is better), then it looks as if there is no way to say the person has produced the wrong resultant seeming based on a mis-weighing of the evidence. Any ideas on how to objectively determine the weighing of evidence?

My research is primarily in the area of reflective equilibrium. This method of moral justification is often charged with being intuition-laden, so the growing literature on experimental philosophy and intuition is of sincere interest. In the journal Behavior and Brain Sciences I came across an article about moral heuristics. It includes a primary article by Cass R. Sunstein and an extensive peer commentary on his article. Sunstein discusses heuristics and reflective equilibrium. Commentary related to this topic include: Peter Singer’s “Intuitions, Heuristics, and Utilitarianism,”  Edward Stein’s “Wide Reflective Equilibrium as an Answer to an Objection to Moral Heuristics,” and Philip Tetlock’s “Gauging the Heuristic Value of Heuristics.” In discussing the link between heuristics and morality Sunstein states:

Much of everyday morality consists of simple, highly intuitive rules that generally make sense, but that fail in certain cases. It is wrong to lie or steal, but if a lie or a theft would save a human life, lying or stealing is probably obligatory. Not all promises should be kept. It is wrong to try to get out of a longstanding professional commitment at the last minute, but if your child is in the hospital, you may be morally required to do exactly that (p. 531).

I plan on posting on this article in the future, but for now I wanted to bring it to your attention. The article can be found at the following site within Cambridge journals.