• Knowledge channel/methodology X (e.g. RE, judgment skepticism, epistemic conservatism) relies on psychological facts (beliefs).
• X assumes those beliefs are unproblematic.
• However, those beliefs are problematic (i.e. access to the beliefs is problematic, X cannot explain/defend the beliefs).
• So, X must be abandoned as a knowledge channel/methodology because X’s reliance on psychological facts is problematic.

In working through chapter 7 I have realized that Williamson keeps reapplying the reasoning above to different philosophical methodologies (1). However, there is something right about this reasoning. It is beneficial to the enterprise of philosophy to spotlight methodologies relying on unexamined  assumptions. It is correct to label methodologies as problematic pending further defense of those assumptions. Williamson makes this point in connection with RE:

[O]ne has no basis for an epistemological assessment of the method of reflective equilibrium in philosophy without more information about the epistemological status of the “intuitions.” In particular, it matters what kind of evidence “intuitions” provide (2007: 244).

RE must defend the intuitions it relies on. The epistemic status of intuitions (as inputs in the RE process) must be elaborated. Based on his comments it seems Williamson is unaware that the literature on RE contains accounts addressing the epistemic status of considered moral judgments (i.e. RE’s version of intuitions). Some philosophers hold that intuitions constitute evidence like observations in science do. If this is the case, then ”observed facts are sometimes relevant evidence,” as Williamson objects, and this is no problem for RE. There are, however, problems with the analogy between intuitions and observation reports. I address these issues within the RE literature in the first half of my thesis. In the second half of my thesis I provide a positive account of the epistemic status of intuitions. It is my hope that this account can establish the evidential value of intuitions and directly address the concern Williamson raises. This makes it reasonable to rely on intuitions within RE methodology, as within RE are found the tools for explaining and defending the status of intuitions as evidence.

Notes

(1) I wonder if this way of thinking pervades the entire book. If so, what seems like a dynamic tome on philosophical methodology reduces to a one trick pony (i.e. externalism is true, or internalism is false).

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P.S. I will be on a brief hiatus from blogging. I am in the process of moving (fun, fun, fun). Also, I am trying to decide what kind of posting to do next. I will likely take a break from commenting on a chapter from a book and proceed on a topic-by-topic basis. Though, I must admit, I am tempted to tackle some of Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence. I am still kicking around that possibility.

• (FAL): A term r is used imprecisely when the argumentative weight r must carry within the argument is disproportionate to the actual weight presented for the term either within the argument itself or within one’s peer community.

(FAL) might cover using terms out-of-context and misusing terms against their actual (or disputed) use within one’s peer community.

Objection: Isn’t this is what analysis is—the percise use of concepts and language? Why not just say people are doing bad analysis when they use terms loosely?

Answer: People are doing poor analysis, but (FAL) helps focus on the poor use of terms within the broader analytical apparatus.

An example of (FAL) in action is a recent blog post by Kvanvig. In his post Kvanvig used the term “reflective equilibrium” loosely. I raised this to his attention in reply #7 found here. He clarified his use of reflective equilibrium as not a method of justification but as shorthand for the result of achieving consistency between general and particular judgements. However, reflective equilibrium is a method of (moral) justification. It is a further misappropriation to use it in the epistemic sense; or, at a minimum, it is a poor choice to use it epistemically because it “takes on” an insurmountable number of deficiencies (i.e. problems within no known solution in belief revision, objections to coherentist methodology and problems with intuitions). Reflective equilibrium is not the result of consistency between general and particular judgments. This blurs the distinction between judgments and principles and wide and narrow versions of the method. There are more problems with his use of the term, but my question is this: Why didn’t he just say he was talking about prodding his students toward a search for consistent beliefs?

Answer: Because Kvanvig was using the term to carry weight in his argument that was disproportionate to its actual weight or value. 

(FAL) is a tempting technique because it’s an easy way to add force to your argument without much work. When this occurs over time, such terms become the bloated technology stocks of the late 1990′s. And, like the stock market, one’s peer community can buy into the hype and perpetuate the false perception. There are probably a host of justifications for the habitual use of (FAL) terms: why raise such “minor” issues, everyone seems OK with using it loosely, and so on.

Ironically, (FAL) must itself be revised because a term within the definition is another term used loosely by the analytic community (i.e. weight). When I get back from the upcoming workshop I plan on exploring “weight”. It is used in many different contexts across a spectrum of sub-disciplines within philosophy. What is going on when people use the term “weight” as something that carries argumentative force? What does it mean to say that X outweighs Y? What does the use of this term presuppose? Does the use of the term vary across philosophical concepts (e.g. intuitions, beliefs, desires, reasons, judgments, principles, and so on)? Those are a few of the questions that might be worth exploring.

First, let’s setup one of Dan’s arguments. In Theory of Justice (p.45) Rawls contrasts intuitionist versus constructivist solutions to the priority problem. Dan takes Rawls’ comments to imply that people can choose to make the moral facts as simple or as complex as they want. If this were true, according to Dan, wanting the priority problem to have a solution would make it have a solution. This would be a strike against the intuitionist because he believes that the plurality of competing values cannot be simplified; there are no higher order principles that can be ranked and consulted to determine the outcome and settle the issue between competing values or moral facts. Dan takes the quote from Theory (p. 45)  to imply that we could choose to make the moral facts simple, thereby defeating the intuitionist’s complexity thesis. From this line of reasoning the following argument is laid out on page 19:

1. Choices in the original position determine the principles of justice.
2. The principles of justice chosen in the original position determine the moral facts.
3. People in the original position would choose to make the moral facts simple.
4. So, moral facts are simple.

To show how deficient such reasoning, Dan runs a parallel argument about a batter wanting to hit a home run: (i) if a batter’s choices determine the trajectory of the bat and (ii) the trajectory of the bat determines if the ball goes over the wall, then (iii) every batter would chose to hit a home run on every pitch, so (iv) every batter would hit a home run on every pitch. Dan analyzes premises (1 and i) and shows how many factors determine whether the choices a batter makes determine the trajectory of the bat or whether choices in the original position determine the principles of justice. He weakens this premise to account for these factors (i.e. choices, under ideal conditions, contribute to determining…).

Next, Dan skips premise (2) and argues against premise (3). This is a mistake because (2), while stated explicitly by Rawls, is take out of context and misused by Dan. (2) is not a premise Rawls uses in an antirealist argument against the independent existence of moral facts. Rawls is not constructivist in terms of being an antirealist; instead, Rawls is a constructivist along Kantian lines. He believes certain criteria can be used by rational people in deliberation to reach agreement or disagreement about what is the case. Rawls thought people in the original position could reach agreement in judgments. The principles chosen in the original position and their coherence with moral judgments produces an outcome that reflects our moral sensibility.

Rawls was not arguing that people can fashion the moral facts in any way they see fit. The moral facts are not constructed in the sense of being infinitely pliable (thus, they are able to be made simple or complex based on how we want them to turn out).  Instead, the moral facts are constructed because simple facts, the existence of which Rawls or Kant would not deny, are determined to be moral facts by principles that assign them weight as reasons. This assigning of weight solves the priority problem. The moral facts are then used, within RE or the categorical imperative procedure, to support certain conclusions. Moral facts are not infinitely pliable nor are they fixed ethical truths. They are simple facts principles have selected as relevant from a moral point of view. I would reformulate the argument as follows:

1. Choices in the original position determine the principles of justice.
2. The principles of justice chosen in the original position determine the moral facts.
3. People in the original position can agree (or disagree) about the moral facts.
4. So, moral facts are objective.

Another consequence of Dan misconstruing the form of constructivism proposed by Rawls is that his argument against RE reaching equilibrium is on less sure footing. That is, it is wrong to associate the set of stable judgments with ethical truths. The target of reasoning for Rawls is not ethical truths but objectivity in the sense of agreement that mirrors our sense of justice.

My research is primarily in the area of reflective equilibrium. This method of moral justification is often charged with being intuition-laden, so the growing literature on experimental philosophy and intuition is of sincere interest. In the journal Behavior and Brain Sciences I came across an article about moral heuristics. It includes a primary article by Cass R. Sunstein and an extensive peer commentary on his article. Sunstein discusses heuristics and reflective equilibrium. Commentary related to this topic include: Peter Singer’s “Intuitions, Heuristics, and Utilitarianism,”  Edward Stein’s “Wide Reflective Equilibrium as an Answer to an Objection to Moral Heuristics,” and Philip Tetlock’s “Gauging the Heuristic Value of Heuristics.” In discussing the link between heuristics and morality Sunstein states:

Much of everyday morality consists of simple, highly intuitive rules that generally make sense, but that fail in certain cases. It is wrong to lie or steal, but if a lie or a theft would save a human life, lying or stealing is probably obligatory. Not all promises should be kept. It is wrong to try to get out of a longstanding professional commitment at the last minute, but if your child is in the hospital, you may be morally required to do exactly that (p. 531).

I plan on posting on this article in the future, but for now I wanted to bring it to your attention. The article can be found at the following site within Cambridge journals.

(H): Any putative source of evidence that is hopeless ought not be trusted (p. 327).

Why should we affirm (H)? Without philosophical methods, and the evidence they are based on, possessing self-correcting abilities errors remain undetected and an entire discipline can get off track, chasing futile lines of reasoning. There is no good way to resolve disagreements between theorists when they are using hopeless sources of evidence. Positively formulated, there are four ways our practices can avoid being hopeless. These criteria are considered sources of hope.

• External Corroboration: Verifiable against fact and theory.
• Internal Coherence: Agreement both within and across subjects. Ability to filter outliers, inconsistencies and contradictions.
• Detectability of Margins: Zones of reliability are clearly demarcated.
• Theoretical Illumination: Understanding why the thing works when it works and why it doesn’t work when it doesn’t.

Weinberg argues intuition fails to affirm principle (H) for reasons I won’t rehearse in detail. Basically, intuition fails to consist in the aforementioned sources of hope. I will argue that intuition taken as a stand-alone source of evidence is hopeless, but intuition is hopeful when embed within the practice of reflective equilibrium.

So that I’m not talking past Weinberg (a complaint he levels against defenders of intuition), it’s important to keep the target before us. Weinberg is targeting a narrow range of the use of intuitions (e.g. Gettier cases, Searle’s Chinese room, Davidson’s Swampman). Weinberg is not an outright skeptic of intuitions, hence the title of his paper, rather he is skeptical of the way philosophers have used intuitions. He claims philosophers use intuitions as foundational bits of evidence, which do not require further defense or empirical justification. Specific intuitions about specific cases are used to argue for or against a particular claim. If philosophers actually use intuitions in this way, then I agree with Weinberg that the practice is hopeless. I also agree with Weinberg that, “hope does not always come from intrinsic aspects of the source of evidence itself so much as from the particular practices of using it” (p. 331). Yet, Weinberg fails to argue that Searle and Davidson were using intuition in the limited sense, as foundational bits of evidence, to support their philosophical theories. Without this argument another plausible interpretation of philosophers’ use of intuition is that intuition is being used pragmatically.

Philosophers may be using intuitions in a way that roughly mirrors reflective equilibrium (RE). This becomes clearer as one zooms in and out of the arc of a philosopher’s argument, as one views her whole body of work and as one traces how her thought progressed based on critical dialogue with other philosophers. Disagreement prompts revision and refinement. In such a practice, intuitions serve as revisable bits of data. Confidence in particular intuitions about particular cases may vary depending on how an intuition relates to the whole set of data. Intuitions feed the inference machine by providing a practical starting point for the formation of a robust theory or form of epistemic justification. I could make a stronger case for this point by specifically showing how Searle and Davidson are using intuitions in this way, but, for now, the mere plausibility that this is what is happening is enough to cast doubt that both proponents and opponents of intuition know what they are doing when they are using intuitions. I hold that they are using intuitions as useful heuristics or first approximations. These approximations often alert philosophers and their audience that something else must be accounted for—that there is a need for additional reasoning, theorizing and analysis.

Finally, I will argue intuitions are hopeful when used as bits of evidence within the method of reflective equilibrium. Intuitions gain their hope within RE because RE is a practice that exhibits all four criteria of hope.

• External Corroboration: Empirical facts and a wide range of theories are considered; adjustments to one’s total set of evidence are made in light of these considerations.
• Internal Coherence: To quote Rawls, the goal of reflection is, “a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view” (TJ, p. 21).
• Detectability of Margins: Conditions prone to error are filtered out as intuitions become considered judgments. Initial confidence in what seems the case is refined as intuitions are thrown out that were made under conditions of emotional duress, conflicts of interest and other distorting factors. Further, the margins of correctness are determined as inference proceeds and inconsistencies between judgments, principles and theories are spotted and corrected.
• Theoretical Illumination: Logical inference, belief revision and folk psychology provide a theoretical canvas to explain the success and failure of trying to reach a mutually coherent set of judgments, principles and theories.

My contention is that philosophers implicitly, and poorly, use a method that approximates reflective equilibrium when deliberating and justifying their claims. Instead of going back and forth about whether armchair philosophy is valid or whether what seems to be the case varies according to socio-economic demographics our efforts will be better spent refining what philosophers naturally do. That is, the method of reflective equilibrium needs to be made more rigorous or it needs to be abandoned. But, if it is abandoned, a suitable alternative needs to be put in place. Currently, I am not aware of a more robust method of justification. Such a method is not found by arguing about intersubjective agreement, trying to locate the source of origination of intuitions or trying to determine when intuitions work as stand-alone (foundational) sources of evidence. Rather, our efforts will be better spent refining the method of reflective equilibrium.