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Category Archives: Epistemology

Contrastive Bayesianism

09 Feb

One way to argue against Elliot Sober’s Contrastive Empiricism is to claim that the approach violates an important principle of confirmation theory. Branden Fitelson (2010) has done this in a recent paper by providing a counterexample to Sober’s Law of Likelihood (LL) for ‘favoring’ relations. According to (LL) evidence E favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 if and only if H1 confers greater probability on E than H2 does. You compare the likelihoods of alternative hypotheses. Fitelson argues against (LL) by proposing a counterexample. The counterexample includes the following facts:

  • E: The card is a spade.
  • H1: The card is the ace of spades.
  • H2: The card is black.

This makes the probabilities run as follows: Pr(E|H1) = 1 and Pr(E|H2) = 1/2. So, on (LL), E favors H1 over H2. However, this seems wrong. The truth of E guarantees (or necessitates) the truth of H2, but the truth of E doesn’t guarantee the truth of H1. This makes E conclusive evidence for H2 but not H1. So, it seems E favors H2 over H1 despite the likelihoods pointing the other direction. For Fitelson this suggests the following confirmation principle, called Conclusive Evidence (CE), a principle which (LL) violates:

  • (CE) If E constitutes conclusive evidence for H2, but E constitutes less than conclusive evidence for H1, then E favors H2 over H1.

In email correspondence with Fitelson I argued against (CE) by claiming that it causes probability and entailment to come apart. In this post I want to propose a different idea.

Carnap (1962) proposes two independent confirmation measures. The first is confirmation as firmness. Confirmation(f) tracks both truth and entailment. The second is confirmation as increase in firmness. Confirmation(i) tracks entailment in addition to an intuitive relevance. I think this suggests a Relevance (R) principle:

  • (R) If E constitutes conclusive evidence for H2, but E constitutes less than conclusive evidence for H1, then E is more relevant to H2 than H1.

If Fitelson’s use of ‘conclusive evidence’ is to work with regard to confirms(i) it should work with regard to relevance. In the card-drawing counterexample is the fact that the card is a spade (E) more relevant to the fact that the card is black (H2), or is (E) more relevant to the fact that the card is the ace of spades (H1)?

For one thing, relevance cannot be assimilated into entailment. This is because confirms(i) tracks entailment AS WELL AS relevance, according to Fitelson. If E is conclusive evidence for H, then Pr(H|E) = 1. In the counterexample, E is conclusive evidence for H2, as E establishes H2 with certainty, yet Pr(E|H2) = 1/2 and Pr(E|H1) = 1. This means H1 entails E, but H2 doesn’t. However, H2 seems more relevant to E than H1 even though H1 entails E. That the card is black is more relevant to the claim that the card is a spade than that the card is the ace of spades is relevant to the claim that the card is a spade. The latter claim is redundant whereas the former claim delimits, and adds to, the semantic content on the table. “The card is black, and by the way, the card is a spade not a club.” On this account, relevance provides non-redundant semantic information in helping the inquirer delimit the space of logical possibilities.

By contrast, it is true that if the card is a spade, then the card is black. But this is running things in the opposite direction from what I stated above. This makes it the case that the card is a spade (E) is more relevant to the claim that the card is the ace of spades (H1) than (E) is relevant to the claim that the card is black (H2). In this direction the color of the card in terms of meaning is already bound-up in the card being a spade. A spade in a standard deck is by definition a black card. My basic idea is that (intuitive) relevance is a measure of the degree to which something doesn’t participate in semantic redundancy.

In conclusion, I claimed (R) is false. Intuitive relevance, when it comes to conclusive evidence, works in the opposite direction of probabilistic strength and entailment. This means (CE), which implies (R) in order to qualify under a confirmation(i) measure, is also false. If confirmation(i) only tracks entailments, and relevance is dropped from the measure, then confirmation(i) can be assimilated into confirmation(f). This is because confirmation(i) involves necessary preservation of truth. If confirmation(i) isn’t different than confirmation(f) by virtue of tracking a type of relevance, then confirmation(i) is merely tracking truth-preservation. That is, confirmation(i) is merely tracking truth and, as such, is not independent from confirmation(f).

 
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Posted by on February 9, 2011 in Bayesianism, Branden Fitelson, Confirmation Theory

 

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Conferences: Inference, Formal, Exact and Ordinary

07 Feb

Here are links to excellent upcoming conferences.

 
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Posted by on February 7, 2011 in CFP, Conferences, Formal Epistemology

 

Workshops: Metaethics & Epistemology

04 Feb

Here are links to two workshops of note.

 
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Posted by on February 4, 2011 in Conferences, Epistemology, Metaethics

 

Post 4: The Factivity Problem Remains Dissolved

20 Jan

This post concludes coverage of the factivity debate. Brueckner and Buford (2010) fire the last shot. They claim that Baumann’s response, which I covered in post 3, only works because the time-indexing of knowledge-attribution sentences was dropped. Let me explain.

As you may recall, the debate is over premise (3) in the Factivity Problem. The question is: Can Mary know in her demanding context a sentence about Frank’s epistemic status (i.e., that he knows that Mary has hands) is true in Frank’s less demanding context? According to Brueckner and Buford, Mary would have to know that she has hands in order to know whether the sentence about Frank’s epistemic status is true. Given Mary’s evidence and her demanding context, it’s not possible for Mary to know that she has hands; thus, it’s not possible for Mary to know the sentence about Frank’s epistemic status in his context is true.

Baumann claims this response doesn’t work because it requires Mary to have prior knowledge that she has hands independent from, and prior to, her knowing that Frank knows that she has hands. This is false because testimonial knowledge can be given and attained, even within a demanding context. This knowledge allows, for instance, Wiles to know that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true by reading about his results in a newspaper. Wiles had no prior knowledge of the results of Fermat’s Theorem. By analogy, Mary can “read” knowledge of Frank’s epistemic status off Ann’s testimony. Ann has better evidence of the truth of the sentence about what Frank knows about Mary having hands.

Enter: Brueckner and Buford’s final response. The problem stems from a mischaracterization of the time sequence. At time (t) Mary’s evidence about her having hands doesn’t qualify to meet the demands put on knowledge in that context. Baumann loses the time-indexing and proposes another time (t’) at which Mary meets Ann. At (t’) Mary gains testimonial knowledge and comes to know that Ann’s utterance of the sentence ‘“Frank knows that Mary has hands” is true in O’ is true in D. This is because of (X):

  • (X) ‘Ann knows that Mary has hands’ is true in D.

However, contrary to Baumann’s insistence, the time shift from (t) to (t’) doesn’t hinge on a principle like (Prior). Mary doesn’t have prior, independent knowledge that the sentence is true. At (t) she has no such knowledge, but at (t’) she does have such knowledge. Brueckner and Buford are fine with this type of gain in testimonial knowledge. Their key point is that Mary’s epistemic state has altered from (t) to (t’). There’s nothing wrong with Mary failing to know that she has hands at (t) and Mary knowing that she has hands at (t’). Focusing on (t) Brueckner and Buford’s response to the Factivity Problem still stands.

Tracking this debate has been interesting. Regarding the debate itself, I would say Brueckner and Buford’s challenge is still on the table. It seems the Factivity Problem is not a problem for Contextualism. The burden of proof is on those who want to apply the problem to contextualism and then fend off the problem. Otherwise, the Factivity problem seems like a pseudo-problem. It dissolves upon closer inspection.

There might be different avenues for the contextualist to pursue in showing the problem is real and that the problem can be handled. The ‘B vs. B&B’ debate focuses around a single premise in the Factivity argument because it is viewed as, “By far the most promising way of attacking the view that there is such a factivity problem for contextualism” (Baumann 2010: 84). Yet, different avenues remain open to the contextualist. She could attack closure, factivity or disquotation principles. I wonder what the prospects are for focusing on the factivity claim in the argument ?  Listen to how strongly Baumann expresses the pull of the factivity claim:

It certainly seems weird if not crazy to deny the factivity of knowledge. Whatever knowledge is, it is factive. Nothing is a concept of knowledge in a broad sense if what it is a concept of isn’t factive. The solution to the factivity problem proposed here will therefore not deny factivity (Baumann 2008: 584).

The quote above strikes my ear as argument by brute force. Baumann doesn’t think denying the factivity claim is promising. He doesn’t argue against it because “obviously” knowledge is factive. But, couldn’t a contextualist deny factivity on fallibilist grounds (e.g., Stewart Cohen 1988)? Why does Baumann think attacking factivity is so “obviously” unfruitful? Why must it always be the case that if someone knows something then what they know is the case?

I close on a methodological note. It’s interesting to track a philosophical debate because there’s a narrowing effect that often occurs. For example, the Factivity Problem originally addressed contextualism and SSI. However, SSI dropped out of the picture never to return. I have found this true in my own work. I recently was involved in a debate that focused around a single issue. I kept trying to explain and argue a small point. After failing to make headway I conceded the point to my interlocutor. Ironically, conceding the smaller point allowed me to argue for a larger point more effectively. This is why it’s beneficial to frequently zoom out and locate the contested point in the bigger picture. For the Factivity Debate to continue the discussants need to let go of premise (3) and look at other lines of debate, including forgotten aspects of the bigger picture.

 
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Posted by on January 20, 2011 in Anthony Brueckner, Contextualism, Factivity, Methodology, Peter Baumann

 

Workshop: Feldmania!

10 Jan

Over at Think Tonk Clayton Littlejohn just announced this year’s Brackenridge workshop. It features talks on the work of Richard Feldman. The preliminary schedule looks outstanding. If you can make it to UT San Antonio February 18th and 19th, I definitely recommend attending this workshop. Access the preliminary schedule here.

 
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Posted by on January 10, 2011 in Conferences, Epistemology, Evidentialism

 

Post 3: Baumann Argues the Factivity Problem is Real

07 Jan

This post continues following the dialectic in the factivity problem for contextualism. Now our attention turns to Baumann (2010) in the journal Analysis.

In post 2 we saw Brueckner and Buford (2009) dissolve the factivity problem. They did this by claiming step (3) in the factivity reductio is false. Step (3) is ‘Mary knows that “Frank knows that Mary has hands” is true in O’ is true in D. Brueckner and Buford claimed Mary can’t know that Frank knows that she has hands. The truth of (3) requires the truth of:

  • (6) ‘Mary know that she has hands’ is true in D.

On contextualism (6) is false, and because the truth of (6) requires the truth of (3) this makes (3) false as well. As such, for Brueckner and Buford, the factivity problem doesn’t apply to contextualism. Baumann (2010) tries to locate Brueckner and Buford’s argument for the requirement principle—that the truth of (3) requires the truth of (6). He is not able to find such an argument. Instead Baumann claims that Brueckner and Buford are relying on a stronger principle than the requirement principle. Baumann lists the Priority Principle (Prior) as follows:

  • (Prior) If B knows that A knows that p, then B has antecedent knowledge that p independently from and prior to the knowledge that A knows that p (p. 86).

After pinning (Prior) on Brueckner and Buford, Baumann raises a counterexample to (Prior). The counterexample involves Paul reading in a newspaper that Wiles proved that Fermat’s conjecture is true. From doing this Paul could have come to know that Fermat’s conjecture is true. Arriving at this knowledge didn’t require that Paul had prior knowledge that Fermat’s conjecture is true. If this were the case then only mathematicians familiar with the truth of the conjecture could have come to know that the conjecture was true through reading the report that Wiles proved Fermat’s conjecture. Similarly, testimonial knowledge (even in demanding context D) can be given such that Mary could learn from Ann that (1) [i.e., ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is true in O].

Baumann’s counterexample works based on transmission of knowledge within a context that is demanding but not completely skeptical. Baumann takes this a step further and says that, even within context D, Ann might have better evidence than Mary. This evidence might make it true that ‘Ann knows that Mary has hands’ is true in D. As Baumann says, “Mary can thus gain testimonial knowledge about Frank’s epistemic state concerning the proposition that she, Mary, has hands” (p. 86). This would make (3) true [i.e., (3) ‘Mary knows that (1)’, is true in D].

While I’m sympathetic to Baumann’s line of reasoning about transmission of testimonial knowledge I’m not clear how Ann’s evidence escapes the (Prior) principle? I agree that Mary can learn about Frank’s epistemic status from Ann regarding the proposition that she has hands, but how does Ann learn about Frank’s epistemic status from within D without entering into an infinite regress of testimonial justification? At some point, someone must have known that p independently from and prior to the knowledge that S knows that p. But this requires that someone to know that p, which from within context D is false. This is precisely what makes the context demanding: Mary can’t know that she has hands; she can’t directly know that p from within D.

 
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Posted by on January 7, 2011 in Anthony Brueckner, Contextualism, Factivity

 

Post 2: Brueckner and Buford’s Solution to the Factivity Problem

14 Dec

I’m back from a brief hiatus from blogging. In this post I continue writing on the factivity problem for epistemic contextualism and subject sensitive invariantism (SSI). In the first post I outlined the factivity problem for contextualism as articulated by Peter Baumann (2008). I also discussed Baumann’s solution to the problem. Enter Anthony Brueckner and Christopher Buford (2009).

Brueckner and Buford propose an alternative solution to the factivity problem. They extend the factivity problem to SSI. As a result of this extension, their solution to the problem is uniform in that it applies to both contextualism and SSI. According to Brueckner and Buford the factivity problem is only an apparent problem, not a genuine one; whereas, for Baumann the factivity problem is a genuine problem.

Recall that the factivity problem results from combining a factivity claim with a standard closure principle. The factivity claim (F) is:

  • (F) ‘S knows that p‘ (as uttered in a context) is true → p

The closure principle (Clos) is:

  • (Clos) ['S knows that p' is true in context C and 'S knows that p → q is true in C] → ‘A knows that q‘ is true in C.

The reductio involves Mary and Frank. I will not rehearse the entire reductio here (see the first post for schematic details). However, I will explain the last part of the reductio because it involves the claim around which the controversy centers (i.e., claim 3).

Mary is in a demanding context (D) while Frank is in an ordinary context (O). A contextualist will want truth-value of utterances (sentences) to vary with the context of utterance. If Mary utters ‘Mary knows that she has hands’ in context D this sentence is not true in D. If Frank utters the same sentence in less-demanding context O, then ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is true in O. Mary in context D can learn from Frank and come to utter claim 3:

  • (3) ‘Mary knows that “Frank knows that Mary has hands” is true in O’ is true in D.

Using the factivity of knowledge claim (F) we can claim that:

  • (4) ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is true in O → Mary has hands.

Because Mary understands the factivity claim this leads to (5):

  • (5) ‘Mary knows that (4)’ is true in D.

Combining (Clos), (3) and (5) results in:

  • (6) ‘Mary knows that she has hands’ is true in D.

This is a problem for contextualism because it contradicts contextualism’s commitment that truth-value varies with context (i.e., that ‘Mary knows that she has hands’ is not true in D). Brueckner and Buford generate a parallel factivity problem for SSI. According to SSI the truth-value of an utterance in a context varies with the subject’s interests and stakes. For one subject it matters a lot whether φ is the case while for another subject not much depends on whether φ is the case. The SSI version of the reductio contains something like controversial claim (3). Both versions of the factivity problem share this feature: a subject who does not have knowledge that φ can correctly attribute that knowledge to another another subject. Brueckner and Buford dissolve the factivity problem for contextualism and SSI by denying this is the case. As they claim, “the theories are not committed to the possibility of such asymmetrical knowledge attribution” (2009: 434).

Brueckner and Buford hold that (3) is not true. That is, contextualists are not committed to claiming that Mary can know that ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’. Recall that to know whether ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is true in O Mary must know whether Mary has hands (i.e., must know whether p is the case). However, anyone in D, including Mary, cannot know that they have hands. So, a condition for the truth of ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is true in O fails to be satisfied from within D. The contextualist can, however, claim that the truth of ‘Frank knows that Mary has hands’ is satisfied up to the truth condition. But, in order for ‘Mary knows that “Frank knows that Mary has hands” is true in O’ is true in D to be the case it requires the truth of ‘Mary knows that she has hands’ is true in D. Because the last statement is false for the contextualist, (3) is false as well. So, the factivity problem does not go through. It’s not really a problem for the contextualist. A similar claim is made about the factivity problem for SSI.

 
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Posted by on December 14, 2010 in Anthony Brueckner, Contextualism, Factivity, Peter Baumann, Subject Sensitive Invariantism

 

CFPs: Reasons, Gauthier, SLACRR

22 Oct

Recently, there have been some outstanding call for papers (CFPs) announced. These opportunities are as follows:

  • Reasons of Love: This conference is in Leuven (Belgium) from May 30 - June 1, 2011. The deadline for submission is December 1, 2010. Click here for more details.
    • Some Conference Questions: Do ‘the reasons of love’ constitute a
      genuine, distinctive category of reasons?  Are different kinds of love related to different kinds of reasons? What are the requirements of love, as opposed to the requirements of duty? Are love’s reasons rational or non-rational?
  • Gauthier Conference: To celebrate the 25th anniversary of Morals by Agreement a conference will be held May 13-15, 2011. The deadline to submit your abstract is January 15, 2011. You can submit an abstract on anything related to rational choice contractarianism. Click here for more details, including a list of participants.
  • SLACRR: The St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) is May 22-24, 2011. Your abstract is due December 31, 2010 . Jamie Dreier is the keynote speaker. Click here to access the conference website.
 
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Posted by on October 22, 2010 in CFP, Conferences, Epistemology, Normative Ethics

 

2011 Purdue Summer Seminar – Skepticism

04 Oct

Purdue is offering a summer seminar on perceptual, moral, and religious skepticism. This seminar is directed by Michael Bergmann. Click here for more information about this opportunity.

 
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Posted by on October 4, 2010 in Conferences, Skepticism

 

Links: Prize, Evidentialism TOC, X-Phi Forum

03 Sep

Here are some links of interest from around the philosophy blogosphere:

  • 3 Quarks Daily 2010 prize for the best philosophy blog post. Click here to read the posts and to vote for your favorite.
  • Trent Dougherty posted a link to the TOC of his forthcoming book Evidentialism and Its Discontents. This looks to be an amazing volume. Much props to Trent and C&F for hosting what looks to be a great discussion of evidentialism.
  • Over at Thoughts Arguments and Rants you’ll find a discussion of the New York Times forum on experimental philosophy. Brian Weatherson and fellow commentors cover a lot of conceptual ground on this important topic.
 
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Posted by on September 3, 2010 in Evidentialism, Experimental Philosophy, Prizes

 
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