On Williamson’s account, a non-theist will say the bible is false and a theist will say it is true, and, as a result, it cannot be admitted as neutral evidence for the hypothesis that God exists…end of story. My methodology opens up greater room for debate and consensus around the evidence admitted for the inquiry. This works to build bridges between the inquirers instead of endlessly using evidence the other party cannot see as relevant. Without going through this process you merely beg the question against the non-theist: using a piece of evidence in dispute to try and prove the thing you are trying to prove; that is, assuming what you are trying to prove by using the Bible (as divinely-inspired authority) as evidence for what you are trying to prove (the existence of God). This is where the second issue comes into play and where your question might take bite.

Using confirmation theory to prove the existence of God or the divine authority of the Bible might be an interesting way of proceeding. Instead of trying to produce logical certainty in an argument for God’s existence, another option is to proceed probabilistically and produce a proof-of-evidence argument supporting the hypothesis. This gets into issues in inductive logic and confirmation theory, but I see no reason why confirmation theory could not inform a probabilistic argument for the existence of God. Developing the argument would prove fruitful. Perhaps I will attempt such an argument in another post.