I am now the editor of the Moral Epistemology category on the PhilPapers website. Feel free to pass along any articles that could go under this category. I am responsible for organizing and populating this category with relevant research.
Monthly Archives: June 2009
Epistemic Intuitions: Adopting a Distinction from Moral Philosophy
I’ve been thinking about two ways of understanding epistemic intuitions. The first view is the liberal view. This is the view proposed by Williamson, Ichikawa, Lewis and Van Inwagen. On this view intuitions are judgments or inclinations to judge. The motivation for this view is that it avoids psychologizing evidence. If intuitions are judgments, then they are not basic sources of evidence. They are more like acts of affirming a proposition rather than basic sources of evidence for the content of a proposition. The second view of intuitions is the restrictive view. According to this view intuitions are a special class of mental states and these mental states are capable of serving as evidence for the propositional content they represent.
In thinking about these two views it occurred to me that it is possible to adopt and adapt a distinction from moral philosophy. Consider reframing these two views in roughly the following way:
- Non-cognitivism (liberal): Intuitions do not evidence the truth of propositions. Intuitions are akin to attitudes of affirmation of propositional content, but they do not count as basic sources of evidence for that content. Intuitions have no truth conditions; they are more like utterances “Yes, that P” or “I agree that P.” Intuitions are attitudes of desire, approval or disapproval.
- Cognitivism (restrictive): Intuitions are states of mind (i.e., cognitive like beliefs are cognitive). Intuitions are able to evidence the truth or falsity of propositions. So, intuitions are capable of being basic sources of evidence.
Cast in this light, what can the debate over epistemic intuitions learn from the debate over the truth-value of moral propositions? Does this recasting of the debate over epistemic intuitions sharpen what is at stake?
Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe
I am working on a response paper to a Phil Studies paper by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux(henceforth, E & M). Their paper is found here.
In “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe” E & M argue intuitions do not play an evidential role. This thesis targets a particular dialectic. E & M recognize a false presupposition in the debate over whether intuitions should or should not play an evidential role. The false presupposition is that intuitions play an evidential role. Against this assumption E & M argue that intuitions do not in fact play an evidential role. They argue for this claim irrespective of whether or not intuitions should play such a role. Intuition-proponents claim intuitions are evidence, so they should play an evidential role. Intuition-opponents claim intuitions are not evidence, so they should not play an evidential role. Assumed within this dialectic is the idea that intuitions play an evidential role. Negating this assumption E & M appear to be putting forward a dialectic-changing thesis.[1] E & M’s thesis promises to generate new lines of research, overcome an exhausted debate that seems to run in circles, and better systematize the data of why intuitions appear to be used as evidence in philosophy but actually fail to be used as such. In my paper “Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe” I argue against E & M’s thesis at length.
In this post, I propose a truncated argument against E & M’s overall thesis, an argument which is not found in my paper. Consider:
- Intuitions cannot play an evidential role (ER) in philosophical inquiry (E & M’s 1st thesis).
- A non-evidential view explains why intuitions seem to play an ER even though they do not (E & M’s 2nd thesis).
- It is possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (E & M assumption).
- Philosophers think intuitions should or should not play an ER in relation to the evidential status (ES) of intuitions.[2]
- E & M argue intuitions cannot play an ER by arguing intuitions are not-E (1 & 2). [3]
- Thus, it is not possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (~3).
Is this a viable argument against E & M’s position? At first glance, it seems to undercut E & M’s method of argument without getting into the details of their proposal. I address the details of their proposal in my paper.
[1] This highlights the importance of arguing against E & M’s thesis. If it cannot be successfully defeated, whole modes of inquiry in philosophy need to be reevaluated or abandoned as futile.
[2] Philosophers argue intuitions should play an ER because they’re E or intuitions should not play and ER because they’re not-E.
[3] E & M must argue intuitions are not playing an ER and they’re not-E. If they said intuitions are not-ER and did not argue intuitions are not-E their position could be the inert view (not-ER, but E). This is a view E & M want to avoid. The move they do make takes a stand on the epistemic status of intuitions, namely, they have a negative ES (they’re not-E).
Intuitions as Enablers
Jonathan Ichikawa put forward an interesting idea on “intuitions as enablers” at the Arché Methodology blog. Access the discussion on this idea by clicking here.
