This is the last in a series of posts on chapter 7 of The Philosophy of Philosophy. Section 7 touches on a subject I have spent some time researching and thinking about: reflective equilibrium (RE). Williamson uses a familiar line of reasoning to argue against RE. This reasoning goes as follows:
- Knowledge channel/methodology X (e.g. RE, judgment skepticism, epistemic conservatism) relies on psychological facts (beliefs).
- X assumes those beliefs are unproblematic.
- However, those beliefs are problematic (i.e. access to the beliefs is problematic, X cannot explain/defend the beliefs).
- So, X must be abandoned as a knowledge channel/methodology because X’s reliance on psychological facts is problematic.
In working through chapter 7 I have realized that Williamson keeps reapplying the reasoning above to different philosophical methodologies (1). However, there is something right about this reasoning. It is beneficial to the enterprise of philosophy to spotlight methodologies relying on unexamined assumptions. It is correct to label methodologies as problematic pending further defense of those assumptions. Williamson makes this point in connection with RE:
[O]ne has no basis for an epistemological assessment of the method of reflective equilibrium in philosophy without more information about the epistemological status of the “intuitions.” In particular, it matters what kind of evidence “intuitions” provide (2007: 244).
RE must defend the intuitions it relies on. The epistemic status of intuitions (as inputs in the RE process) must be elaborated. Based on his comments it seems Williamson is unaware that the literature on RE contains accounts addressing the epistemic status of considered moral judgments (i.e. RE’s version of intuitions). Some philosophers hold that intuitions constitute evidence like observations in science do. If this is the case, then ”observed facts are sometimes relevant evidence,” as Williamson objects, and this is no problem for RE. There are, however, problems with the analogy between intuitions and observation reports. I address these issues within the RE literature in the first half of my thesis. In the second half of my thesis I provide a positive account of the epistemic status of intuitions. It is my hope that this account can establish the evidential value of intuitions and directly address the concern Williamson raises. This makes it reasonable to rely on intuitions within RE methodology, as within RE are found the tools for explaining and defending the status of intuitions as evidence.
Notes
(1) I wonder if this way of thinking pervades the entire book. If so, what seems like a dynamic tome on philosophical methodology reduces to a one trick pony (i.e. externalism is true, or internalism is false).
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P.S. I will be on a brief hiatus from blogging. I am in the process of moving (fun, fun, fun). Also, I am trying to decide what kind of posting to do next. I will likely take a break from commenting on a chapter from a book and proceed on a topic-by-topic basis. Though, I must admit, I am tempted to tackle some of Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence. I am still kicking around that possibility.
I just posted a new paper in which I argue against the total evidence requirement on knowledge. The abstract reads as follows:
- A requirement on rational belief frequently invoked in epistemology and inductive logic is the total evidence requirement (TER). This requirement asks one to consult all evidence when making a determination about what one believes or the degree of confirmation to assign to a hypothesis. Despite the wide-spread use of the requirement there are many problems with it. After explaining the requirement in section 1 of this paper I motivate the requirement in section 2. In section 3, I highlight problems with successive interpretations of the requirement. This applies pressure to abandon TER or revise it. In section 4, I create the proportional evidence requirement (PER). This requirement revises the notion of what constitutes relevant evidence by making the notion proportional to the weight of evidence for a given hypothesis. After formulating two key principles behind PER I realize that one of the principles may not be an improvement over the commitments of TER. So, I revise one of the principles in PER to avoid such problems and create a requirement on evidence that is truly an upgrade over TER. I conclude this paper in section 5 by summarizing and indicating directions for future research.
In this post I will claim that Williamson’s analysis of epistemic conservatism is based on a mistake. Williamson’s mistake in chapter 7, section 6 of Philosophy of Philosophy (POP) involves including the belief that p among one’s reasons for believing that p. To flesh this out I first need to put a few things in place. Consider the principle of epistemic conservatism as formulated by Kevin McCain (2008: 189):
(PEC): If S believes that p and p is not incoherent, then S is justified in retaining the belief that p and S remains justified in believing that p so long as p is not defeated for S.
PEC captures the notion that one has a defeasible right to one’s beliefs. One loses one’s right to one’s beliefs given two conditions of defeat:
(DC1): If S has better reasons for believing that ∼p than S’s reasons for believing that p, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.
(DC2): If S has reasons for believing that ∼p which are as good as S’s reasons for believing that p and the belief that ∼p coheres equally as well or better than the belief that p does with S’s other beliefs, then S is no longer justified in believing that p.
Given PEC, the justification for believing p is analogous to the justification that S’s lacking a defeater provides. Lacking a defeater provides some justification, but it does not count as part of S’s reasons for believing. As McCain mentions, “S’s justification for believing that p is bolstered by her believing that p, but her belief that p does not count among her reasons for believing that p” (2008: 187). In short, belief that p cannot be used as a reason for believing that p. In a situation where S has another belief (or inclination to believe) that is inconsistent with p, S cannot use her believing that p as a reason to continue believing p. DC1 indicates that reasons for believing that ~p can act as defeaters and eliminate S’s justification for believing that p. DC2 indicates that if reasons for believing that ~p rival reasons for believing that p, and the belief that ~p coheres better with S’s other beliefs, then S has lost her justification for believing that p.
Williamson mentions that if intuitions are beliefs then they fall under epistemic conservatism. Do inclinations to believe also give one a defeasible right to one’s beliefs? What does epistemic conservatism council one to do when one has an inclination to believe something that is inconsistent with a belief one is currently committed to? Williamson uses a Gettier scenario to show that one cannot use an inclination to believe to arrive at a new belief. One can be inclined to believe something without believing it, and inclinations can conflict. When an inclination to believe something conflicts with a currently held belief, then, given epistemic conservatism, the currently held belief can be retained. Williamson (2007) arrives at this conclusion by claiming:
If I currently believe p, I am currently committed to the belief that any inclination to believe something inconsistent with p is an inclination to believe something false. I am not committed to the beliefs I am merely inclined to have in the way I am committed to my current beliefs (p. 243).
Given the PEC/DC1/DC2 package, an inclination to believe something inconsistent with a currently held belief (p), namely ~p, can serve as a reason to believe that ~p. That one believes that p cannot be used as a positive reason for retaining the belief that p in the face of reasons against that belief. Conservatism does not commit one to dogmatism. Simply because p is a belief (or because it is believed), and the reason to believe that ~p is arrived at via an inclination to believe, does not warrant retaining the belief that p. The inclination counts as a reason to favor ~p, so it is a potential defeater that must be overcome by reasons in favor of retaining p. Williamson does not offer any. What Williamson argues is that because an inclination is not fully believed it is not enough to overcome a belief that is actually believed or firmly believed. Williamson uses that fact that p is believed as a reason to retain p, which is a violation of PEC.
By contrast, what Williamson needs to argue is that an inclination to believe that ~p is not a reason that trumps the reasons in favor of believing that p. However, as the case is currently constructed, Williamson is not able to do this. In the Gettier case Williamson describes the reason Justin has for believing that knowledge is equal to justified true belief is that “Justin has been brought up to believe” that JTB theory is true. Is familial inculcation a reason for believing p that trumps the intuition that when presented with a Gettier case Justin judges that the Gettier subject has a JTB without knowledge? If anything, familial inculcation is often cited as a source of bias, blind belief and wishful thinking in the face of contrary evidence. This suggests that the inclination to believe that ~p, which is formed when presented with the Gettier case, is stronger than the reasons Williamson presents for favoring the belief that p. Thus, the intuition can serve as a defeater in this case, and epistemic conservatism councils Justin to abandon his inculcated belief and move to the new belief that the subject in the Gettier case has a JTB without knowledge or that JTB theory is false.
Big in the news right now is Ardi — the oldest known hominid skeleton (see the news here). This finding is thought to cast new light on early ancestors to humans and the upright origins of humankind. Without getting into a discussion on evolution I would like to use Ardi as a case study in scientific syntax. My wife is a chemist. She has often said that reporting research involves a great deal of massaging the syntax. How things are worded is important in reporting scientific findings. If things are not worded correctly findings can be overstated or understated. For example, if evidence e shows hypothesis h is probable one would not want to say that the evidence is conclusive in support of the hypothesis (unless the probability surpasses some threshold of conclusivness pre-established or generally understood by that scientific community). Scientific syntax needs to be properly hedged — words need to be properly chosen and arranged — to communicate semantics that are true to the findings. Syntax can even, dare I say, be used to get the findings to say things the evidence does not support.
Below are some quotes from the scientific findings as reported by the scientists in the magazine Science (2 October 2009 Vol. 326). I will place quotation marks around syntax of interest and briefly comment on the quote.
Despite its small cranial capacity, there is “tantalizing evidence” for advanced cranial based flexion in Ar. ramidus. (68e6)
It is interesting that an emotive word like “tantalizing” was used. Here is another quote that utilized a similar emotive word (“anxiously”).
More fossils “will” further advance our understanding of the CLCA, and we “anxiously await” their discovery. (74e7)
The emotive word choice makes the authors seem like they are excited about receiving more fossils, which “will” advance their understanding. There is a presumption in favor of evidence fitting theory and that what is found “will” bolster understanding. A critic might wonder whether there is some “making evidence fit theory” going on.
Now I will highlight the use of hedging in reporting scientific findings.
One of the instructive aspects of adaptive suites is the demonstration of what “must almost always” be a complex network of character interactions, even in reptiles and amphibians. “More often than not“, such interconnectivity is “likely to far exceed” relatively simplistic arguments such as somatic budgeting. (74e7)
What does “must almost always” mean? Is this like Brian Fantana in the movie Anchorman remarking about the effectiveness of Sex Panther cologne: “60% of the time, it works every time”? Also, what does “more often than not” interconnectivity is “likely to far exceed” mean? Does this mean greater than 50% of the time interconnectivity is “probably” going to outperform somatic budgeting. It is difficult to see what this hedging amounts to. Other classic hedging syntax includes: the records “suggest” X, it is now “equally clear” that Y, our comparative analyses of P “suggests” that this “probably” reflects Z. It is hard to track double-qualifications of likelihood and once identified it makes me wonder how much of the syntax is smoke-and-mirror methodology (i.e., purposely not showing one’s full cards). Another possibility is the double-hedging indicates lack of certainty on behalf of the scientists. This is more often than not probably what is going on (lol). Interpreting these findings over a period of years will determine what the findings really mean. It is ultimately the consensus of the scientific community that will settle the meaning of the evidence for various hypotheses about evolution.
Another thing that is clear from looking at the syntax of the Ardi findings is that a great deal of inferences occur in unearthing the fossils, putting together the skeleton, revising the skeleton until the scientists are happy with the reconstruction, building digital reconstructions of the entire skull, pelvis, and limbs to fill in the gaps and generate a fleshed-out virtual model and then from this virtual model drawing inferences about what hypotheses the evidence supports. For example:
The “digitally reconstructed” [Ardi] skull further allows “a variety of inferences” about African ape and hominid evolution. Cranial capacity…was “probably slightly smaller” than….The [Ardi] skull lacked the masticatory specializations of later Australopithecus, consistent with the dental evidence for an omnivore/frugivore niche lacking emphasis on hard and/or abrasive diets. Finally, comparisons of [Ardi] and extant African apes “suggest” that each is unique in aspects of its cranial anatomy. (68e6)
It would be interesting to calculate the probability of the inferences reported in the research. From the evidence the scientists infer that certain conclusions are correct or that certain hypotheses are confirmed. Many of the inferences are based on digital reconstructions. How accurate are the digital models? How likely are the models to reflect the actual creature? Is Ardi representative of that genus of animals? The sample size is so small that it makes me wonder if it is possible to infer from Ardi a conclusion about skull size in relation to Lucy (Australopithecus), especially because the sample size is so small in both cases. In my estimation the probability of these inferences from the evidence is mitigated by so many factors that the probability must be “reported” as small if the findings are to match the probability of the hypotheses conditional on the evidence. However, maybe I’m just playing with the syntax.
In this post, I will primarily summarize the rest of section 5. I will discuss intuition in detail in connection with section 6, but Williamson does raise some worries about intuition in section 5. Again, Williamson wields the evidence neutrality (EN) thesis. This time he uses EN to claim that it cannot be satisfied in relation to the evidential force of intuitions. A theory of intuitions needs to be able to distinguish weak from strong intuitions. This is because a theory of evidence will need to make choices between conflicting intuitions according to their evidential strength. However, according to Williamson, philosophers will tend to overestimate the strength of intuitions they have a vested interest in seeing succeed (i.e., intuitions that support their favored theory of knowledge, evidence or intuitions). Such theory-driven wishful thinking will result in a lack of “uncontentious decidability” as inquirers disagree whether someone (or, they themselves) have an intuition with a certain strength. A distinction was raised by Derek Ball here between the phenomenological and evidential force of intuitions. He argued it is not always clear which interpretation is at stake. Williamson is overtly talking about the evidential force of intuitions, but when talking about aspects of human psychology and vested interests his discussion could be interpreted in terms of the phenomenological force of intuitions. This is because human psychology is to blame for over or underestimating the strength of intuitions. There will be gradations in felt subjective certainty accompanying various intuitions according to whether the intuitions align with one’s professional and psychological interests. Even trying to compensate for bias will be difficult because one can see bias in another person easier than one can see bias in one’s own self. The phenomenological force of intuitions as experienced in consciousness is not a guide to resolving biases. Such factors make it difficult to reach an uncontentious view of the objective facts about intuitions (i.e., their strength in relation to a hypothesis). In fact, Williamson’s point seems stronger when the phenomenological reading instead of the evidential reading is considered. This aligns Williamson’s comments with Jonathan Weinberg’s comments in his paper on the hopelessness of intuitions (i.e., nothing within the intuition signal, or human psychology, is able to adequately recognize and correct cases of intuitions-gone-astray).
In the last half of section 5 Williamson goes into a discussion on the dialectical standard of evidence. Again, Williamson is trying to address the judgment skeptic. This view of evidence avoids the trap of resorting to psychological facts to try and resolve disputes about the evidence. In a dialectical context evidence is that which is uncontroversial in that debate or context. Evidence does not have to be foundational or uncontroversial across all contexts. Instead, it only needs to be uncontroversial in that context; if inquirers can agree over what counts as evidence, then what they agree on counts as evidence in that context. Williamson finds this view of evidence wanting because it results in conceding too much to the skeptic. Accepting as evidence only propositions that are true if one is a BIV, in order to have meaningful debate with the skeptic, does not have to lead one to a wholesale acceptance of skepticism about the external world. However, according to Williamson, giving the skeptic his or her premises forces one into a conclusion that one does not endorse. If one does not play the skeptic’s game, then the dialectical standard of evidence ends up being irrelevant. Another possibility is to switch to a non-dialectical standard. Given this standard the fact challenged by the skeptic is not disqualified as evidence. For example, one might take the fact that a Gettier subject lacks knowledge or the fact that there are mountains in Switzerland as evidence even though these facts are contentious to the skeptic. To ignore these facts is to violate the Carnapian total evidence requirement. Williamson wonders if such a move is a legitimate response to judgment skepticism?
Williamson’s conclusion is that we need to widen our evidential base. Even if intuitions were the most reliable forms of evidence it does not follow that we should restrict our evidence to just intuitions. Facts that the judgment skeptic hold as highly probable (in contrast to contentious facts about the existence of mountains) are not to be the only facts considered. We do not need to play the skeptic’s game just because she holds that only facts that are certain (because they align with the micro-physical structure of the universe) can be admitted as evidence. According to Williamson there is nothing wrong with continuing to claim knowledge of truths in contention. The “dialectic” is not the measure of all things. As Williamson says:
No methodology is proof against misapplication by those with sufficiently poor judgment.
It is not the job of good methodology to silence all people who propose, for instance, astrological predictions as truths. Instead, good methodology must separate good from bad intellectual practices. I imagine Williamson thinks he is doing this by contributing to the literature on philosophical methodology, by uncovering things like the consequence fallacy and other ways methodology goes astray. This is a useful endeavor, but because of Williamson’s clear bias for knowledge-first epistemology, epistemic externalism and a whole host of other theoretical commitments in analyticity, assertion, and so on Williamson’s work could be accused of the very thing he is arguing against, namely, proposing an account of methodology to philosophy in general (even giving the book the sweeping title The Philosophy of Philosophy) in a way that is highly uncontentiously decidable and violates the total evidence requirement by primarily using evidence from Gettier cases and revisionary metaphysics. As I have studied chapter 7 in POP I have kept coming back to inconsistencies between the content Williamson is arguing for and the methodology he is using in arguing for it. I’d be curious to know if anyone else has noticed the same inconsistencies.
Because there are many ideas of interest in section 5 of chapter 7 in The Philosophy of Philosophy (POP) I have decided to split this section among a couple of posts. In this first post I consider the following argument (p. 235) on how traditional skepticism narrows the base of evidence:
- Evidence is true (assumption).
- The proposition that I have hands (p) is not evidence in a skeptical scenario because it is false (given 1).
- According to the skeptic it is contentious that I am not in the skeptical scenario (assumption).
- So, it is contentious that p is evidence (2,3).
- Therefore, given the Evidence Neutrality (EN) thesis, p is not evidence (EN,4).
- Only the proposition that it appears to me that I have hands (p*) is evidence (assumption).
- Since both the common sense scenario and the skeptical scenario are consistent with all my evidence I cannot regard the former scenario as more probable than the latter (skeptical conclusion).
The moral of the story for Williamson is that the traditional skeptic can use EN, which is defined and explored in this post, to make it the case that the skeptical scenario cannot be ruled out; thus, it is not the case that I know I have hands or that the external world exists. One problem I have with Williamson’s formulation of the argument is the transition from p to p*. In 2, the proposition p is false because in the skeptical scenario it falsely appears to me that I have hands. My experience of hands is just an induced delusion at the hands of a mad scientist or an architect of The Matrix. In 6, the proposition p* is true. How can p be false because it falsely appears to me that I have hands and p* be true because it appears to me that I have hands? Is not falsely appearing the same as apperances being false? Even though in the skeptical scenario it is true to me that it appears that I have hands I cannot use that psychological fact to satisfy EN because it is contentious that p* is true because it falsely appears to me that I have hands. In the skeptical scenario p* is false as well as p.
Another feature of the argument I find puzzling is the jump from 5 to 6. Even if p is not evidence it is not clear that the only option for finding a proposition that can count as evidence is to resort to psychological claims. Even if, as I explained above, the shift from p to p* fails because p* is also false it is not clear that the only option for looking for true propositions is by turning inward. In a scenario like The Matrix there are glitches in the system that clue people, like Neo, into the fact that reality is not what it seems. A skeptic who uses a Matrix-type scenario can search for evidence in propositions about glitches in the fabric of space-time or computer-coded reality. In The Animatrix these things include:
a section of the house where it’s raining, cans that float in mid-air, doors that go nowhere, and best of all the characters get to slow down time and do leaps and twirls reminiscent of someone who’s jacked into the Matrix knowing how to bend its rules. http://www.thematrix101.com/animatrix/beyond.php
Williamson could make 6 a disjunction: the skeptic must use either a true proposition that exposes the falsehood of appearances or a proposition about appearances. Because propositions about appearances are not true (and only truths count as evidence) this forces the skeptic to use, for example, a proposition that cans float in mid-air (p**) as evidence that the skeptical scenario cannot be ruled out. This makes it the case that no matter which way the skeptic turns she cannot get her conclusion that the common sense scenario and the skeptical scenario are equally probable conditional on one’s evidence. This blocks the use of EN to generate traditional skepticism, which is not a bad thing because it is not clear that traditional skeptics endorse anything like “uncontentious decidability” among a community of inquirers. The traditional skeptic cannot and need not psychologize evidence.
In an age when armchair practices have taken heat from experimental philosophy I have opted to take the armchair to the extreme!
I couldn’t resist posting a picture of my new armchair. It’s a dream come true for a guy like me who deals with back problems. I think full-tilt mode = fall asleep.
Section 4 of chapter 7 in The Philosophy of Philosophy aims to identify the judgment skeptic’s mistake. In context, Williamson argued in section 3 that the same line of critique judgment skeptics use against folk theory can be used against elements of judgment skepticism that rely on folk theory. A judgment skeptic holds that we cannot know mountains exist because our evidence is neutral between the ordinary hypothesis and the skeptical hypothesis. Instead, there are only micro-events that humans errantly, though conveniently, classify as mountains. The result, however, is that we cannot possess knowledge or justification about beliefs concerning mountains. When this kind of reasoning is ported over to general skepticism it become clear (according to Williamson) that the reasoning is unsound. With the context of section 3 in mind I return to section 4. Williamson wants to identify the mistake in the judgment skeptic’s reasoning. What makes this line of reasoning bad?
There are two mistakes that Williamson identifies. The first mistake is the use of so-called appearance principles, and the second mistake is committing the consequence fallacy. I will discuss each of these mistakes in turn.
An appearance principle is defined as follows:
[O]ne should be confident that P (on the basis of common sense) only if its appearing (by the standards of common sense) that P is good evidence that P. (2007: 227)
Williamson shows that appearance principles can be used as premises in an argument for general skepticism as well as judgment skepticism. This is a problem because judgment skeptics want to exclude the results of particle physics from skepticism so that they can claim underlying micro-physical events entail the impossibility of mountains. I will provide you with an overview of Williamson’s argument.
Let SS be the judgment skeptic’s scenario in which there are no mountains. In this scenario it falsely appears that there are mountains even though mountains are a metaphysical impossibility. If there really are mountains, then SS must not obtain. For the judgment skeptic: one should be confident that SS does not obtain only if its appearing that SS does not obtain is good evidence that SS does not obtain. However, appearing that SS does not obtain is not good evidence that SS does not obtain, according to the judgment skeptic, so one should have low confidence (in one’s judgment) that SS does not obtain. Now, I turn to a distinction.
Roughly, something is truth-indicative if the appearance of it raises the probability of P. If, on the other hand, appearance (used as a conditional on P) does not raise the probability of P above the probability of P alone, then appearance is falsity-indicative. Appearance principles require one to modulate one’s confidence in P according to how appearance that P provides evidence that P, and only if the appearance of P is truth-indicative should one be highly confident in P.
The use of appearance principles in the reasoning above can also generate general skepticism. Let p be a description of the external world that jives with the judgment skeptic’s understanding of particle physics. Imagine SS* is an evil demon scenario in which p is false but an evil demon makes the truth of p seem to hold. By the same reasoning, the appearance that SS* does not obtain is not evidence that SS* does not obtain (i.e., it is not truth-indicative) because appearances to a subject are systematically deceived by the demon. So, given the appearance principle, one should have low confidence that SS* does not obtain. Because p (the existence of the external world) entails that SS* does not obtain, then one should modulate one’s confidence in p to accord with one’s confidence that SS* does not obtain. The result is that confidence in p should be low even when its appearance raises the probability of p. So, we should be skeptical about the existence of the external world as described by particle physics. Williamson cuts the legs out from under the judgment skeptic’s reasoning. Or, does he?
I’m not satisfied with Williamson’s pattern of pulling the judgment skeptic into general skepticism. Why? The mere possibility of an evil demon scenario precludes the use of appearance principles. In such a scenario appearances are false and, consequently, apperance principles do not hold. Who would reasonably argue that in a Matrix world one should be confident that P only if it appears that P is good evidence that P? By the assumptions of the scenario it appearing that P will not be good evidence that P. So, to argue that appearance principles used in such a scenario result in skepticism about a domain judgment skeptics endorse (particle physics) seems like a ticky-tacky move at best and unwarranted at worst.
The second mistake in judgment skepticism is the consequence fallacy. This fallacy involves criticizing confidence in a theory by focusing on a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. Take the following argument Williamson outlines (2007: 233):
- Physical events occur that folk geography takes to constitute the presence of mountains in Switzerland.
- If physical events occur that folk geography takes to constitutes the presence of mountains in Switzerland, then there are mountains in Switzerland.
- There are mountains in Switzerland.
A person who subscribes to folk geography is likely to endorses the whole argument. However, a judgment skeptic jumps off the boat at premise 2. That is, the evidence may increase the probability of premise 1 but not premise 2. The fallacy comes from arguing that the failure of increased probability in 2, conditional on the evidence, is reason to hold that a high degree of confidence in both 2 and 3 is not warranted. It may be that it is still reasonable to hold a high degree of confidence in 2 and 3 even though evidence raises the probability of 1 but not of 2. The problem comes from, “identifying a logical consequence of the theory (not itself a logical truth) whose probability is not raised by the evidence” (2007:232). It is not the case that evidence raising the probability of a hypothesis makes more probable a logical consequence of that hypothesis. In fact, according to Williamson, when the evidence makes the hypothesis more probable, but not certain, it decreases the probability of the logical consequence of the hypothesis. When evidence makes a hypothesis certain it does not make a logical consequence of that hypothesis more probable. Thus, evidence making more probable premise 1 but not 2 is not a basis from which to argue that one is not entitled to a high degree of confidence in premise 2 and 3.
Williamson’s logical consequence point brings up issues in confirmation theory. His point has prompted me to explore confirmation theory in more detail. Some useful reads in this regard can be found here and here.
In addition to the great phil papers aggregator of all-things-philosophy there is a lesser-known philosophy aggregator at alltop.com. The aggregator can be found here. It tracks several important philosophy websites, journals and blogs. You can even submit your own philosophy site, or another site, for alltop to track.
Upcoming Post: Chapter 7, Section 4, The Philosophy of Philosophy
